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ABSTRACT

This thesis describes a framework, a component of a
larger paradigm, designed to improve the thinking,
planning, and acting of individuals within society.

It is

based upon factors of human existence that most can agree
are fundamental to pursuing matters of importance, however
disparately we may see them.

Assuming that human choice is

a function of consciousness and compassion— it argues that
insight from ethics and policy studies can be improved if
founded upon an understanding of the implications of the
full development and use of the essential human capacities
that underlie consciousness and compassion: critical and
creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts;
and cooperating in inquiry and action.

It argues that for

any ethical or policy judgment to be "essentially human" it
must both employ the essential human capacities of all
those involved or affected and account for its impact upon
those capacities, as far as is reasonably possible.
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PREFACE
There is a certain risk of confusion inherent in
what follows, which I should like to minimize through these
comments.

Thesis as Part of a Broader Model
The purpose of this thesis is to develop and
demonstrate a framework for achieving understanding,
discovering questions, solving problems, and resolving
conflicts as a process tending toward a well-considered,
comprehensive and coherent product, or "Quality Judgment."
This process, which I call an "Essentially Human Judgment
Process," may also be called "Quality Judgment" in the
sense that it is a product as well as a process.

In any

event, both process and product are but parts, though
fundamental ones, of a broader model for ethics and policy
study, which I call "Vision & Value-based Excellence" or,
in its most robust form, the Essential Transconnection
Paradigm.

This paradigm, in turn, is based upon a number

of assumptions, one of which relates to a fundamental world
view, which I call "An Evolving World Ethic."
The risk of confusion arises from the fact that
this framework is described here independently of the
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broader contextual model.

As a result, it may appear at

first glance to be incomplete.
there by necessity.

This incompleteness is

Unlike the more comprehensive nature

of the more robust paradigm, the intent of the thesis is to
build the minimally sufficient framework for a frame of
reference employing, reflecting, and considering that which
is essentially human.
As such, it is a meta-ethical, meta-political
framework that is pre-constitution, pre-law, pre
principles, and pre-values.
itself value-neutral.

That is not to say that it is

It might be accurate to say that the

framework describes the values behind the values; the
principles employed within the frame of reference as
algorithms or heuristics are those dictated by the context,
history, and relationships of those involved and affected
by it.

So, provided the framework is employed, it makes no

difference what the actual purposes, visions, values or
views of reality of all those involved and affected are.
It is only "of the essence" that they be well-considered
and that due weight is given to how well-formed they are.
Both the notions of "Vision & Value-based
Excellence" and an "Essentially Human Judgment Process" are
born of a quest for understanding my own life experiences,
especially service during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars,
practice as an attorney and businessman, and loves won and
lost.

The notion of a judgment being of "Quality" was
viii

suggested by Daniel Yankelovich in his book Coming to
Public Judgment.

With the goal of trying to determine what

a "Quality Public Judgment" would look like, the model, of
which this thesis is a part, took shape.

Thus, the working

title of a work in progress developing the Essential
Transconnection Paradigm is Quality Public Judgment:
Discussion, Dialogue, and Inquiry in Ethics and Policy.
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS
In the final, and most abstract, analysis, all
ethical and policy judgments are concerned with notions of
what is good, true, and beautiful for an individual, group,
or community.

More concretely, human action is a function

of visions of a desired future, views of reality, and
expectations as to the possibilities of action that must be
well-formed for any individual or group or community to
achieve their aims consistently.

That is, visions of a

desired future must be challenging, integrating, and
achievable,

lest lives be filled with apathy, missed

opportunity, or failure.

Views of reality must be

comprehensive, sustaining, and accurate, lest lives be
filled with unpleasant surprises, passivity, and wasted
energy.

Expectations as to the possibilities of action

must permit anticipation, innovation, and excellence (see
Barker 1992, 11-13, 139), lest lives be at the power of
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events, mired in the solutions of the past.

In short, if

visions, views, and expectations are not well-formed,
neither individual nor group nor community can consistently
achieve the good, the true, and
Essential to

the beautiful in life.

developing any such vision, view, or

expectation is a well-developed perspective— the faculty of
seeing all relevant data, concepts, and valuations in a
meaningful relationship, one to another.

All individuals

(regardless of perspective), however, think, plan, and act
as parts of wholes that are themselves parts of greater
wholes.

Our thought processes, our languages, and our

habits,

customs, and traditions are all of the essence,

at

one and the same time, of both the part and the whole.
This suggests that there might be some set of concepts that
all policy makers and analysts can accept as fundamental to
good public policy— the procedural values behind the
substantive values, as it were.

So, taken together, these

suggest that any person or group striving to make wellformed ethical or policy judgments must take into account
the w e 11-developed perspectives of all those involved in,
or affected by, the judgment.
The purpose of this thesis, then, is to develop and
demonstrate the concept that a framework employing the
well-developed perspectives of all persons affected by a
judgment is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition
for any individual or group to reach and implement
judgments of quality effectively and efficiently.

As such,

it proposes a relatively simple conceptual framework to
bring into play all the human perspectives that together
constitute human reality when thinking, planning and acting
for ethical and policy purposes.

It is designed to be

fundamental to any system, principle, or model that one
would employ for ethical and policy decision-making.

Thus,

if one would employ principles of justice (however defined)
or caring or utility, the concepts developed herein ought
to be employed in acting on, and arguing from, those
principles.

Moreover, these concepts ought to be employed

ab initio in deciding whether to adopt those principles.
This framework, together with the chosen set
principles, etc., would constitute a frame of reference
that one would employ in making ethical and policy
judgments— a structure of views of reality, symbols and
concepts, and valuations and values by means of which an
individual, group, or community perceives or evaluates
data, communicates ideas, and regulates behavior.

Its goal

is insight into, and understanding of, the diverse
perspectives that make up our world as a means to truth
(see Lipman 1988, 148; Sleinis 1994, Chap. 2).
Since it is designed to discover relevant
principles or apply adopted principles, the concepts
developed here are value-neutral as to what judgments
should be reached.
value-neutral.

This is not to say that it is itself

It is to say that the values are embedded

in the framework itself, from which other values may be
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inferred, not as judgments, but as necessary conditions.
It is, in this sense, meta-ethical, meta-political, that
is, pre-constitution, pre-law, pre-principles, and pre
values .
It is designed to be fundamental to action and
argument, whatever the actor's ends-in-view or standards,
criteria, principles, or values.
meta-ethical.

Hence, its approach is

It assumes that— whether the actor values

fairness or justice or caring; whether he or she orders his
or her affairs according to a theory of social contract or
rationally developed duty or virtue ethic; and whatever his
or her notion of beauty— consistently achieving his or her
ends-in-view over a lifetime requires that certain human
attributes and capacities be developed, maintained, and
employed for him or her to act and argue from a foundation
of truth.

Thus, if one wants to be just or pursue

'the

greatest good for the greatest number' or care for all
those deserving of care or fulfill a social contract that
might have been developed behind a veil of ignorance, I
assume that there are certain aspects of humanity, which
all or most of us can agree, are necessary to do or argue
well.

Essential Human Attributes
Life of the human being is characterized by action
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098al6-17; Mises 1966, chap. 1)
and argument (Hoppe 1993, 152-56; see, e.g., Nicomachean
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Ethics).

Human choice is a function of both (see

Nicomachean Ethics 1.2.1112al7, 6.2.1139a31-34; Owens 1991;
Mises 1966, 12-13; Hoppe 1993, 180-81).
compassion are components of choice.

Consciousness and

If, taken together,

choice, consciousness and compassion are considered to be
essential^ human attributes, how does one develop,
maintain, and employ one's essential human attributes such
that one acts and argues well?

That is, how does one

expand one's consciousness such that one is able to make
better choices of, and deal more appropriately with, the
objects of one's compassion— all with a view to creating
the life one truly desires to live (see Senge 1992).
Human Choice
Human choice is a fundamental attribute of the
human being; it has been recognized as such at least since
the ancient Greeks (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics
3.2.Illlb4-1112al8)
Mises (1966),

It is, in the words of Ludwig von

"a person's conscious adjustment to the state

of the universe that determines his life" (11).
In this thesis, I follow Aristotle in distinguishing
a choice from opinion (Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.llllbll-12).
As Aristotle observed,

"anything may be a matter of

opinion— we form opinions about what is eternal, or
impossible,

just as much as what is within our power

(3.1.llllb31-33).

As he observed, people themselves

differ, some excelling at choosing, others at opining.

I

6
also join Aristotle, who concludes that choice is
"voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice
involves reasoning and some process of thought"
(3.2.1112al4-17).
Human life is an unceasing sequence of choosing
among various opportunities seen to be available to the
choosing individual that results in a linked chain of
actions (Mises 1966, 45).

Human choice itself is largely a

function of consciousness, specifically the attention we
pay to the situation before us: what we see and feel, what
we value, what relationships we recognize (Csikszentmihalyi
1991, 33).

Thus, deliberation leading to choice must have

some w e 11-developed input in the form of data, concepts,
and valuations to lead to effective and efficient
judgments, arguments, and actions.

Human Consciousness
The notion of human consciousness, however, defies
easy definition.

Following Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1991),

this thesis takes a phenomenological approach to
consciousness, defining it as intentionally ordered
information.

Consciousness gives us the capacity to become

aware of ourselves, the capacity to learn and grow, the
capacity to imagine a future, the capacity to change the
world.

It allows us to choose to act in, rather than

merely react or adapt to, the world surrounding us.
Human consciousness provides the fundamental
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knowledge and understanding that the human being employs in
making choices and acting.

"Some people learn to use this

priceless resource efficiently," Csikszentmihalyi (1991)
declares,

"while others waste it."

He observes that:

The mark of a person who is in control of consciousness
is the ability to focus attention at will, to be
oblivious to distractions, to concentrate for as long
as it takes to achieve a goal, and not longer.
And the
person who can do this usually enjoys the normal course
of everyday life.
(31)
Csikszentmihalyi (1993) concludes that, in addition to
chance and necessity,

"Consciousness, this third

determinant of our behavior, can lead to safety or to
destruction"

(15).

Consciousness, then, must be well-

developed, maintained, and employed for judgments,
arguments, and actions to be effective, efficient, and
safe.

Human Compassion
Human choice is driven by more than consciousness.
Human compassion, often inarticulable or unconscious, also
drives human choice.

Human compassion goes beyond animal

altruism, which is limited to relatives or tribes, to a
more universal compassion (Hume 1978, 487; A. Smith 1969,
1976, 47-48).

Annette Baier (1991), for example,

interprets David Hume to say that our nature is "to be
social and passionate, before it is cognitive"

(28-29).

She points out that "our cognitive capacities, both in the
species and in each human infant, develop along with our
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social and emotional capacities."

Human compassion is not

without limits in time, space, and relationship, however.
Nicholas Capaldi (1989) notes that Hume distinguishes
between "weak sympathy" and "strong sympathy":
Weak sympathy is limited to the present moment.
Strong
sympathy gives us a broader perspective, "a lively
notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether
past, present, or future; possible, probable or
certain."
(183)
Among the foremost proponents of an ethic of
compassion or caring are feminist philosophers, such as
Carol Gilligan, Annette Baier, Claudia Card, Nel Noddings,
and Rita Manning.

Manning (1992), for example, has

observed that an ethic of caring requires both a
disposition to care and an obligation to care for (61-62).
She concludes, however, that:
Finally, one need not respond to every need.
In
choosing how and when to respond, one should consider
the seriousness of the need, the benefit to the one
needing care of filling this particular need, one's own
capacity to fill the need, and the competing needs of
others, including oneself, that will be affected by
filling this particular need.
(64)

Procedural Values Behind the Values
Following Csikszentmihalyi (1993), this thesis
considers the various ethical'and policy systems,
principles, and models that have been espoused over human
recorded history to have been well-intentioned, but driven,
in either concept or application, by:
genetic instructions, which were once necessary to our
survival, but are often in conflict with present

reality; the distortions of the culture in which we
were born[;] and [the distortions] that result from the
emergence of the self as a separate entity making its
own claims on the mind.
(xvii)
This results in attention, awareness, memories, patterns of
thought, and hierarchies of goals in consciousness that
result in different visions, values, and notions of
excellence driving our choices.

It also results in

differing notions of who (or what) should be the objects of
our compassion— and what should be done to deal with them—
within those visions and reflecting those values and
notions of excellence.
Having assumed these ethical and policy systems,
principles, and models to be well-intentioned, the question
remains, how do we develop, maintain, and employ our
fundamental human attributes in a world of disparate
systems, principles, and models?

The underlying premise of

this thesis is that human beings are characterized by
choice, consciousness, and compassion, which are
implemented through thinking, planning and human action.
This having been said, however, the essential human
attributes are not capacities subject to nurturance and
development such that they might be said to be "essentially
human."

For example, if one is to expand, raise, or

enlarge o n e ’s consciousness; make better choices; or deal
more appropriately with the objects of one's compassion,
there are more basic human capacities that must be welldeveloped, maintained, and employed for one to do so.
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Certain human capacities allow us to further
develop and employ consciousness,

choice and compassion.

I

assume these to be critical and creative thinking;
communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in
inquiry and action.

Together, these capacities give us the

unique capability to appreciate the nature of the world and
our relationships to it.

These three capacities, then, may

be said to be the "Essential Human Capacities" in that they
are of the essence and essential to our ability to relate
to the world around us, to choose wisely, and to deal
appropriately with the objects of our compassion: in short,
our abilities to think, to choose, to plan, to act, and to
reflect and learn successfully in a changing, often
challenging, environment.
In the history of philosophy, the problem of the
relationship between existence and essence has been one of
the most difficult (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967b, 552).
From the ideals of Plato before the Christian Era to the
medieval thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, much of philosophy
had sought an abstract, universal frame of reference that
might define existence.

Hence, the Thomistic notion of

"essence" as signifying "a mode or manner according to
which reality might be fashioned"

(1967a, 547; 1967b, 550).

As rationalism came to dominate the philosophical scene,
essence and existence came to be replaced by the Hegelian
notion of idealism:

"Existential reality is there but a

backdrop or, even less, a kind of concept that combines
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with concepts of essence to weave the abstract texture of
the real"

(1967b, 552).

The 'existentialists' reacted

insisting in various ways that the fundamental question
was, how does one exist as a true human being?"
731).

In this view,

(1967d,

"the concern of the existentialist is

not with the general and the universal but with the
singular and the individual"

(ibid.).

Having said this, and having used the term
"essential" throughout this thesis, it is not my purpose to
join that battle.

Richard Shusterman (1992) points to the

paradox involved in claiming that one is not an
essentialist— it may "turn into an inverted essentialism of
anti-essentialism which asserts

'the universality and

necessity of the individual and contingent'"
1992, 83, quoting, in part, Rorty 1989, 26).

(Shusterman
My

perspective, as set forth in more detail in the next
Chapter, is existentialist, implying a focus on the
concrete and the individual as opposed to the abstract and
the universal (New Catholic Encyclopedia 1967c, 724-25).
To avoid the Shusterman Paradox, I use the terms
"essential" and "of the essence" in the common, descriptive
dictionary sense of something necessary and fundamental or
basic to human action or argument.

Toward An Essentially Human Judgment Process
This approach concentrates on the human capacities
that human beings employ to expand consciousness, to make
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intelligent choices, and to deal properly with the objects
of our compassion so that they may argue and act well.

It

makes a case for the development, maintenance, and
employment of the Essential Human Capacities, which have
evolved to exercise those attributes— critical and creative
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and
cooperating in inquiry and action— as integral to our
perception, participation, processes, and policies in an
increasingly challenging world.
In broad terms, one might say that there are two
alternative consensual ethical systems: (1) an autonomous,
rational set of ethical principles employed to pursue the
individual, concerted, and mutual ends of all affected by a
decision, which ends are sought of their own accord, or (2)
a heteronomous, faithful set of ethical principles
requiring adherence to the authority of another to pursue
individual, collective, or universal ends urged by the
other (Mises 1966, 147-48; see also Rothbard 1982, 17;
Neuhaus 1992; Novak 1993).2

The essential difference

between the two is that in the first instance acceptance of
the principles follows understanding and in the second
acceptance follows deference.
Neither is inherently right.

At any particular

point in time, the situation, as then understood, may be
such that it would be appropriate for an individual— given
his or her limited capacity for understanding, lack of
time, or dearth of information available to make a
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judgment— to defer to another's judgment as to what
constitutes an appropriate set of principles.

It is just

such a division of labor in policy matters that St. Thomas
Aquinas urges in "On Kingship or The Governance of Rulers":
it is not possible for one man to arrive at the
knowledge of all [things that are necessary for human
life] through the use of his reason.
Thus it is
necessary for him to live in society so that one person
can help another and different men can employ their
reason in different ways. . . . (quoted in Sigmund
1988, 14-17; see also Niebuhr 1932, 21)
Such deference is indeed the lot for most of us,
most of the time.

As Ludwig von Mises (1966) observed:

Common man does not speculate about the great
problems.
With regard to them he
relies upon other
people's
authority, he behaves as
"every decent fellow
must behave," he is like a sheep in the herd.
It is
precisely this intellectual inertia that characterizes
a man as a common man.
Yet the common man does choose.
He chooses to adopt traditional patterns or patterns
adopted by other people because he is convinced that
this procedure is best fitted to achieve his own
welfare.
And he is ready to change his ideology and
consequently his mode of action whenever he becomes
convinced that this would better serve his own
interests.
(46)
In any event, it is often the case that the ends
sought by both approaches appear to be roughly the same.
Whether the individual or community actively identifies and
develops its principles, or whether she or they defer to
the authority

of another, seems to depend upon the

situation and

state of development of

the Essential Human

Capacities.
For example, following Aldo Leopold in A Sand
County Almanac (1949), in part, I consider an "ethic" to be
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a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle to exist
(202, 203), but, going beyond
. . t o have energy, and to

Leopold, I would add
evolve."

Neither the world nor human beings have merely
existed over time.

Our power

consciousness and compassion,
of the world.

to choose, based upon our
have evolved and are a part

Thus, I look at ethics, first and foremost,

as a component of a vision of that life that is deemed to
be good, together with the role that truth and beauty play
in that vision, and what it means to be a human being
within such a vision.

If, as will be demonstrated later,

that which any individual values at any given point in time
is subjective, in the sense of being the result of
individual intellect and moral agency, then no person or
body of persons could have the knowledge required to make
intelligent decisions for the entire community.

It

follows, therefore, that an ethical system ought to include
an autonomous, rational set of ethical principles employed
to pursue the individual, concerted, and mutual ends of all
affected by a decision, which ends are sought of their own
accord.
This approach is intended to provide a meta-ethical
framework toward developing them.

If the goal for an

ethics and policy decision-making process is to reach a
judgment that allows each and every individual to create
and live the life he or she deems worth living, then an
"essentially human" decision-making process seems to be of
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the essence and essential.

The underlying theme of this

thesis, therefore, is an ethics and policy framework based
upon the development, maintenance, and employment of the
Essential Human Capacities as components, which could be
widely held to serve as the procedural values underlying
the substantial values.

This framework will be called an

"Essentially Human Judgment Process."
As founded, this meta-ethical and policy system
itself may be said to be humanistic, atheistic or agnostic,
but it is designed rather to be "entirely neutral with
regard to religious beliefs which do not pretend to
interfere with the conduct of social, political, and
economic affairs"

(Mises 1966, 155).

The values contained

in religious beliefs are accounted for in the frames of
reference of those arguing and acting, but are not included
as a component of the framework itself.

Its ultimate

objective is aid decision-makers to arrive at good
arguments and action-guiding principles leading to ethical
and policy judgments that will avoid the violent conflicts
that must disintegrate the social cooperation of acting
individuals.
This Essentially Human Judgment Process operates
within a broader framework of human decision-making and
action within society, which I style the "Essential
Interdependence Paradigm," and develop in Part II, Chapter
4.

The notion of "Essential Interdependence" is used to

emphasize the role of the Essential Human Capacities in
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social functioning and to distinguish it from a deceptively
similar "model" developed by Emile Durkheim, which stresses
"organic solidarity" and "functional interdependence"
(Giddens 1971, 76-79).

Of course, neither his paradigm nor

the Essential Interdependence Paradigm developed in this
thesis rises to being a model in the sense of being a frame
of reference.

Conclusion and Preview
Having assumed that these Essential Human
Capacities are critical and creative thinking,3
communicating in symbols and concepts, and cooperating in
inquiry and action (cf., Watson 1990, 459) and having
identified them for inclusion into an "Essentially Human
Judgment Process, the next task is to develop a framework
for reaching ethical and policy judgments that (1) employs
these Essential Human Capacities where appropriate,

(2)

evaluates the input from participants in terms of its own
criteria for good judgment, and (3) takes into account the
impact of the judgment upon the Essential Human Capacities
of all those affected by it.

Only through such a process

might we approximate, what might be styled,

"Essential

Human Truth," that is, an approximation of reality as a
means toward creating the lives we truly desire to live: an
approximation as accurate as the employment of the welldeveloped Essential Human Capacities of those involved and
affected will permit.
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The thesis is developed in three multi-Chapter
Parts.

In the balance of Part I, I will argue against two

faulty assumptions underlying most modern ethical and
policy theory and develop a number of philosophical and
psychological concepts, which lend both credit and detail
to elements of the proposed framework.

With this

background in mind, Part II will develop a metaethical/political framework for an essentially human ethics
and policy judgment process based upon the human capacities
for critical and creative thinking; communicating in
symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and
action.

It will place special emphasis upon the impact of

various aspects of time on human judgment.
The core theme of Part II is that these capacities
must be well-developed and employed, or facilitated,

for

ethical and policy judgments of all sorts to be effective,
efficient, and safe.

Moreover, to the extent those

involved or affected do not fully employ these capacities,
that should be accounted for expressly in evaluating the
input to our judgments.

Finally, the purpose of any

resulting ethical or policy judgment ought to be expressed
in terms of its impact, as made and implemented, upon the
Essential Human Capacities.
Part III applies the framework deriving a number of
policy implications and describing developing some
methodological guidelines, which can be used to estimate
the degree to which a community, its judgment processes,

18
and its policies approach the ideal of being essentially
human.

Though the framework has general applicability to

all ethical and policy analysis, evaluation, making and
implementation— including, but not limited to
environmental,

foreign, social, and economic policy— the

guidelines will be used in this thesis to consider a single
policy issue of great import on the current scene: single
parent welfare policy.
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Chapter Notes/I
1-The sense in which "essence" and "essential" are
used in this thesis is developed later in this chapter.
^The political scientist Charles Lindblom would
suggest a third consensual system, persuasion, • in the form
of education, advertising, and propaganda (see deHavenSmith 1988, 52).
3I could follow here the reasoning of Michael Scriven
that critical thinking necessarily includes creative
thinking, but I am persuaded by the rationale of Matthew
Lipman that distinguishes, and integrates them, as higherorder thinking.
I reject, for the purposes of this thesis,
the notion that truly comprehensive thinking requires
"systems thinking," but would allude to that requirement by
calling the capacity "comprehensive thinking" (compare
Scriven 1976, 35-36 with Wilber 1995, 19-24; Lipman 1991,
19-25; Senge 1990).

CHAPTER 2

FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING ETHICAL
AND POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Two Faulty Assumptions
The nature of the assumptions underlying ethical
and policy decision making are not idle matters; they are
fundamental to the manner in which we see the world, we
relate to it, and we act in it.

As Amitai Etzioni (1988)

has declared in another context:
At issue is the paradigm we use in trying to make
sense out of the social world that surrounds us, and of
which we are an integral part; the paradigm we apply in
the quest to understand and improve ourselves, those
dear to us, and those not so dear.
(ix)
Before proceeding further, it is important to address two
common assumptions regarding human nature that underlie the
ethical and policy decision-making processes that this
thesis is designed to replace or supplement.
The first assumption is that human behavior can be
analyzed and understood, to the relevant degree, in terms
of general ideas considered as though they have an
existence independent of the accumulated experiences in
which they originated.

The second assumption is that human

behavior can be analyzed and understood, to the relevant
20
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degree, in terms of formal and impersonal relationships.
Since World War II, Anglophone writing on ethical
and policy systems, principles, and models— both private
and public— tends, for the most part, to be based upon
these two faulty assumptions.

Social policies based upon

theories founded on these two assumptions frequently
(often, necessarily) exclude the agency of the individuals
affected, directly or indirectly, including their
characters and subjective ends.*

They are, unwittingly, a

return to the abstract and universal of the essentialists
and the idealists, even to the extent they are felt to be
derived from experience.
David Hume (1977) described well the difficulty in
applying general rules derived from experience:
The forming of general maxims from particular
observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is
more usual, from haste or narrowness of mind, which
sees not all sides, than to commit mistakes in this
particular.
(71 n. 36, emphasis added)
He concludes noting that: "It would be easy to discover
many other circumstances that make a difference in the
understanding of men"

(ibid.).

Indeed, the issue is deeper than merely the
potential for error due to haste or narrowness of mind.
Claudia Card (1990), for example, summarizing and extending
feminist ethical theory, argues in an essay entitled
"Gender and Moral Luck," that, to the extent that ethical
and policy decision-making are based upon the assumptions
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described above, they fail to consider relationships,
characters, and experiences that have an experiential,
historical richness that purely formal theory cannot reach
and cannot capture.2

she attempts to go beyond the

abstract notions, or values (see Lipman 1993), of justice
and caring, in isolation, to explore the relation between
formal and impersonal relationships with their emphasis on
justice (to the exclusion of caring) and informal and
personal relationships with their emphasis on caring (to
the exclusion of fairness)(200-21).
Card follows Carol Gilligan in arguing that a
helpful ethical perspective is relationship, both
separation (essentially masculine) and connection
(essentially feminine).

Ultimately, she contrasts rights-

based theory with a responsiveness-based theory, i.e.,

"the

idea of taking responsibility for someone or something"
(209).

Observing that modern ethical theory, with the

exception of David Hume, has been "preoccupied with power
and control— its uses, its distribution, its forms"

(208),

she concludes that ethical theory lacks an ethic of
attachment, independent of "the issues of control that have
preoccupied contractualist and utilitarian theorists"
(214).

But, in her view, an ethic of attachment is not

necessarily an ethic of care.

Accordingly, an ethic of

relationships, attachment, and responsiveness should
operate as the starting point for ethical inquiry in her
view.
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There is an old saying that,

"To one whose only

tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail."

The

same idea may be true in ethics and policy studies.

By

analogy,

"Where one pursues understanding preoccupied with

power and control, all basic social institutions will come
to be seen in formal and impersonal terms."

As a result,

for epistemological reasons (especially the unavailability
of sufficient knowledge in a timely fashion) formal and
impersonal social institutions must necessarily ignore
informal and personal relationships.

Especially where

distribution and control are confirmed through the coercive
power of the state, abstract issues of justice must prevail
over the myriad relationships that characterize a society.
Moreover, concentration upon general ideas in the
form of prescriptions and proscriptions— and formal and
impersonal relationships— is based upon, or at least
supports, the notion that society may be organized as one
pleases (Mises 1966, 2).

Ultimately, failure to consider

the characters and relationships of the individuals
affected may result in ethical and policy decisions that
negatively affect, or even destroy, the agency of the very
individuals intended to be benefited.

Attacks on Reason and Expertise
A related development has been a reaction to the
preoccupation with power and control described above, which
has led to attacks against reason itself, especially to the
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extent that its exercise has been preempted by experts.
Robert Formaini (1990), for example, has observed that:
Public policy in the United state is debated, analyzed,
and implemented within a framework characterized by the
acceptance, explicitly or implicitly, of certain
assumptions.
One of the main assumptions is the
objective nature of the reality which surrounds us,
along with a subsidiary assumption concerning the
ability of our techniques to explore and to control
that reality.
(1)
In the selection of the ends or goals of policy—
either public or private— the most common framework for
choosing among competing goals is "some version of policy
analysis, including cost-benefit, cost-effective, and riskbenefit" or a social welfare model based upon Pareto
Optimization (Gutmann and Thompson 1990).

As Amy Gutmann

and Dennis Thompson observe:
All of these approaches rest on the moral
foundation of utilitarianism (insofar as they have any
moral foundation at all). They assume (1) that the
ends or values of policies can be compared by a common
measure of expected utility (also called happiness,
satisfaction, or welfare) and (2) that the best policy
or set of policies is that which maximizes the total
expected utility.
Though the appeal of this approach is that it appears to
resolve conflicts among competing ends in a neutral way,
Gutmann and Thompson outline a number of attacks against
the basic assumptions underlying these various frameworks,
e.g., problems of aggregation and distribution (139).3
More fundamentally, Bryan D. Jones suggests that
there are major limitations to social science theories.
First, they are partial, incomplete, and "[suffer] in the
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extreme from problems in linking theory to data."
1988, 164-65)

Second,

(Jones

"they fail to specify the linkages

between observable human actions and characteristics of
complex social systems."

As a result, Jones argues:

Quantitative empirical studies have tended to test,
more and more rigorously, uninteresting and
atheoretical but statistically precise hypotheses.
Theoreticians are only vaguely aware of rigorous
statistical methods, and tend to be contemptuous of
them.
Because theory and data are so weakly linked,
and because various theories are not integrated, both
empirical studies and theoretical studies have been
driven as much by fad and fashion as by scientific
design.
(175)
Jones urges that these circumstances "ought to make social
scientists humble in their theoretical pretensions, meticu
lous in their empirical analysis, and cautious in their
policy advice."
By way of contrast, Douglas Muzzio and Gerald De
Maio (1988, 129) view the same circumstances and observe
that "most policy studies are empirical, providing only a
summary of statistical associations, unable to explain the
observed relationships."

They urge, however, that formal

theory based upon a deductive approach "can be integrated
with policy analysis" and that, in any event,
theory is the sum of the science" (128).

"formal

Thus, they cite

Ernest Nagel, who "notes that since Aristotle it has been
held that scientific explanations must always be rendered
in the form of logical deduction, that the most
comprehensive and impressive systems of explanation are of
that form"

(128 n. 3).

From this they argue that:
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formal theory can be and has been relevant to major
policy issues, [and] provides a useful way of thinking
about problems and suggests predictive hypotheses.
[I ]t permits rigorous thinking about values and goals
and alternative mechanisms of achieving them.
(128)
The latter insight has been explored by Eugene J.
Meehan (1990), who reported that following testing of
federal policy making with a theoretical apparatus he
developed for policy analysis;
first, the knowledge required for directing actions on
defensible grounds was not usually available; second,
where such knowledge was available, it was usually
ignored by those responsible for making policy.
Both
those who directed the rule-making apparatus and those
who criticized the performance depended heavily on
procedural rather than substantive issues; there were
few signs of significant learning and fewer still of
the use of such learning to improve p e r f o r m a n c e .4
(18)
At bottom, the difficulty may be what Friedrich A.
Hayek, a Nobel Prize laureate in Economics, and a dean of
the "Austrian" school of economics, described as the
"scientistic" approach, that is, the "propensity to imitate
as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly
successful physical sciences— an attempt which in our field
[economics] may lead to outright error"

(23).

These assumptions are not, however, the core of
Formaini's (1989) objections to policy debate as currently
experienced.

Rather, the vehemence of his objections to

the current policy debate centers rather on the role of
experts;
Yet it may be that our confidence is not a function of
the objective reality vie seek to model, but is rather
the result of our having accepted the pronouncements of
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philosophers, scientists, consultants, policy analysts,
and others who have succeeded in convincing most people
of the efficacy of their methods of
analysis. (1; see
also Saul 1992; McCollough 1991, 3, 5, 61, and 82-84)
He declares that for purposes of policy formation,
implementation, and assessment, we are "a nation addicted
to inductive advocacy."

Hence, in a society dominated by

battles between experts, Formaini (1990) observes:
Quite simply, all this expertise has succeeded in
accomplishing nothing so much as it has made it
virtually impossible to tell the serious, knowledgeable
individual from the army of bogus, politically
motivated hucksters that dominate our modern system of
information dissemination.
(3)
Rejecting both risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis as
decisive means of policy implementation and assessment,
Formaini concludes that, since ultimately the populace's
beliefs about policies must be dealt with in any event,
current attitudes of policy elites are:
examples of the very unscientific mindset that experts
so often deplore in other people, for they explicitly
ignore reality by positing a world where perfectlyinformed elites enact correct policies for the good of
all, whether or not such policies are publicly
supported.
(98)
In the same vein, John Ralston Saul, in his book
Voltaire's Bastards (1992), purports to condemn the impact
of reason on public policy, when what he actually supports
is a condemnation of the elitism of experts, who tend to
compartmentalize knowledge.

So, for Saul,

"The essence of

rational leadership is control justified by expertise"
11; see also 476-77).

He makes this point saying:

(10-
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The possession and control of knowledge have become
their central theme— the theme song of their expertise.
However, their power depends not on the effect with
which they use that knowledge but on the effectiveness
with which they control its use.
Thus, among the
illusions which have invested our civilization is an
absolute belief that the solution to our problems must
be a more determined application of rationally
organized expertise.
The reality is that the division
of knowledge into feudal fiefdoms of expertise has made
general understanding and coordinated action not simply
impossible but despised and distrusted.
(8)
Daniel Yankelovich, for example, makes the same
point in Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work
in a Complex World (1991).

Yankelovich demonstrates that

on the issue of American competitiveness on a global scale,
four obstacles to public understanding arise from the
"expert perspective."

First, the issue is "owned" by the

experts as the issue is defined in technical terms staking
an "intellectual and a turf-related claim. "

Second, the

experts hold different values from the public.

Third, the

experts in various fields transmit "confusing and
contradictory messages to the public."

Finally, the

experts and public proceed from different frameworks and
points of departure (105-06).
Friedrich von Hayek (1989) suggests that it is
precisely because of an inappropriate faith in human-kind's
ability to use reason to "construct" the world we want that
we have many of the problems we now have.

In The Fatal

Conceit, his last book, Hayek describes "the revolt of
instinct and reason" and cites literary figures (H.G.
Wells, George Orwell); scientists (Jacques Monod, Joseph
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Needham, Albert Einstein); and economists (John Stuart
Mill, John Maynard Keynes) for the following four
presuppositions regarding what constitutes actionable
knowledge:
(1) The idea that it is unreasonable to follow what one
cannot justify scientifically or prove
observationally (Monod, Born);
(2) The idea that it is unreasonable to follow what one
does not understand (Popper);
(3) The related idea that it is unreasonable to follow
a particular course unless its purpose is fully
specified in advance (Einstein, Russell, Keynes);
(4) The idea, also closely related, that it is
unreasonable to do anything unless its effects are
not only fully known in advance but also fully
observable and seen to be beneficial (the
utilitarians).
(61-62)
Hayek notes that, applying these four presuppositions:
most tenets, institutions, and practices of traditional
morality and of capitalism do not meet the requirements
or criteria stated and are— from the perspective of
this theory of reason and science— "unreasonable" and
"unscientific".
(66)

Conclusion and Preview
It appears that our ethics and policy decision
making models are too narrowly focused, hence not
interdisciplinary or systemic or integrative or holistic
enough, to serve the individual and society well.

It also

appears that the philosophical search for concepts
supporting the development of the autonomous individual as
opposed to the heteronomous society has not provided the
conceptual foundation adequate for an ethics and policy
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decision-making model of use to the autonomous individual
trying to understand and choose within an increasingly
complex social universe.5
This tension is demonstrated, for example,

in

Matthew Lipman's (1993) approach to education.
Acknowledging that the model of education he espouses

(a

reflective model described in more detail in Chapter 5 of
this thesis) has an objective of "the autonomy of the
learner," he notes that "unfortunately, autonomy has been
associated with a kind of rugged individualism: the
independent thinker as a self-sufficient cognitive macho
type, protected by an umbrella of invincibly powerful
arguments"

(Lipman 1993, 19).

He concludes that his model

is actually:
thoroughly social and communal.
Its aim is to
articulate the friction-causing differences in the
community, develop arguments in support of competing
claims, and then, through deliberation, achieve an
understanding of the larger picture that will permit a
more objective judgment.
(ibid.)
In conclusion, then, one can predict that where
ethical and policy judgments are made on a model of general
prescriptions and proscriptions reflecting formal and
impersonal relationships, they are destined to fail to the
degree that they ignore informal, often personal,
relationships and the "different ethical preoccupations,
methods, priorities, even concepts" that surround them and
the experiences that spring from them.

Following Claudia

Card, one would expect that to the extent that ethical and
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policy theory takes "only formal and impersonal rela
tionships as paradigms of obligation and responsibility
[they will have] produced arbitrarily biased and probably
superficial theory"

(Card 1990, 201; see also Baier 1986:

231-260; Flanagan and Jackson 1987: 622-37; Solomon 1992,
114).

Moreover, to the extent that the models are purely

rational, that is, models that ignore that which is felt,
but not thought; that which is known, but not articulable;
and that which is embedded in practices, institutions,
customs, and traditions, but not directly observable, they
fail to consider relationships, characters, histories, and
experiences that have an inductive richness, which purely
formal theory and formal theories of judgment cannot reach
and cannot capture.
This is not to suggest that problems may be solved
by disregarding the general principles derived from the
accumulated experience of the human race or by arriving at
a better understanding of informal and personal
relationships alone.

It does suggest, however, that

effective, efficient, and safe ethical and policy decision
making require a framework that goes beyond inductive
advocacy or ideology dictating what we should choose and
how we should act.

Such a framework, which could be said

to be essentially, uniquely or characteristically human,
should employ and take into account the human capacities
underlying consciousness, choice and compassion in general,
and thinking, communicating, and cooperating in particular.
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It also suggests that a framework that considers the
variety of formal and informal relationships, as well as
the "different ethical preoccupations, methods, priorities,
even concepts" applied in them, will include a human
process in which each individual affected— directly or
indirectly— participates actively, or at least has his or
her interests well-considered by those who do participate.
These two chapters have raised the challenge and
problem of ethics and policy decision-making by giving some
attention to two faulty assumptions underlying ethical and
policy theory.

They have suggested that the problem with

existing methods is fundamentally two-fold.

First, these

methods are based upon the belief that human behavior can
be analyzed and understood in terms of general ideas
considered as though they have an existence independent of
the accumulated experiences in which they originated.
Second, they are based on the belief that they need not be
firmly rooted in an understanding that different
relationships suggest different approaches to
understanding.

These chapters have further suggested that

an approach rooted in that which is "essentially human" may
meet their challenges.
The remainder of Part I treats a number of
fundamental philosophical and psychological issues, lending
credit and detail to the elements of the framework to be
developed.
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Chapter Notes/2
1-See e.g., the modified central thesis of John Rawls'
Theory of Justice as interpreted by Roberto Alejandro
(1993: 75-100).
^Card (1990) asserts that:
Different kinds of relationships have been differently
distributed among men and women in patriarchal society:
a larger share of the responsibilities of certain
personal and informal relationships to women, a larger
share of the responsibilities of formal and impersonal
relationships defined by institutions to men.
It is
plausible that a result has been the creation of a
significant difference in ethical orientation.
(200)
Mother commentators have raised others (see, e.g.,
Tong 1986, 12-38; see also Clark 1991).
^Following a study of federal public housing policy,
Meehan equated twentieth century public policy makers with
eighteenth century doctors and hospitals.
^Mises (1966) notes that it is the rational
appreciation of the division of labor, especially as
elaborated by British political economy, that: "substituted
an autonomous rational morality for the heteronomous and
intuitionist ethics of older days" (147).

CHAPTER 3

PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Before turning to elaborate on the framework
itself, there are a number of basic philosophical and
psychological concepts to develop.

For many, each is a

controversial issue perhaps worthy of a thesis in and of
itself.

Essential Human Capacities
The primary assumption of this thesis is that the
essential human attributes of choice, consciousness, and
compassion are exercised through the essentially human
capacities of thinking, communicating, and cooperating in
inquiry and action.

Thus, an "essentially human" process

would consider cognition, including reason, intuition, and
imagination, in the form of critical and creative thinking;
communicating in symbols and concepts; and social
cooperation in inquiry and action as capacities "essential"
to individuals acting within a society.

Moreover, the

process would be seen to be "not essentially human" to the
extent that the Essential Human Capacities of any of those
involved or affected by a judgment are not employed.
34

As
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the purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework based
upon what an "Essentially Human Judgment Process" might
look like, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an
argument for, or defend, these three capacities as being
"of the essence" of humanity, but it is appropriate to
indicate the philosophical and psychological support from
which the framework proceeds.
The basic grounding for the Essential Human
Capacities can be found in the works of Aristotle,
especially the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics.

Though

Aristotle based his ethical and political writings on the
ergon or function of the human being and concluded that
"what is peculiar to" human beings is logos or rational
principle (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a7-18), he also noted
two other essentially human abilities, speech (Politics
1253a9-16), and social cooperation in perceiving and doing
the good, the right and the other moral qualities (Politics
1253al7-19;

1253a25-29).

Thus, taking Aristotle's basic

approach, i.e., that the end of human life is for the
individual to live an active life of arete (human
excellence, or virtue), ethical and policy decision-making
intended to contribute to the human good should employ
these Essential Human Capacities and consider the impact of
a judgment upon them.
The role of rationality in social living is a
fascinating issue, worthy of more attention than this
thesis is able to grant it, but a few observations are

36
appropriate, by way of extension and limitation.

Robert

Nozick (1993), for example, suggests that rationality
itself may have a social component:
If rationality evolved alongside the concurrent
rationality of others, then each person's rationality
may have a character that fits it to work in tandem
with that similar rationality of others.
(178)
Indeed, as Ludwig von Mises (1966) has observed, our
working assumption throughout our lives is that other
people's thought processes are essentially the same as our
own though what they are conscious of and value may differ
dramatically (25, 32-36).
The psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has
qualified the rational Aristotelian approach insofar as he
has pointed to other mental activities in which human
beings must become proficient if we are to create the lives
we truly desire to live.

Csikszentmihalyi (1993)

acknowledges that ” [m]uch of what we call civilization
consists of attempts at rationalizing life, so that action
can be predictable and reasonable"

(41).

This takes the

form of "rational, logical structures by which to order
thoughts and actions."

Nonetheless, he asserts:

The future . . . is not constrained by rules and
predictable outcomes.
We need to cultivate more than
logic if we want to thrive in it. We must foster
intuition to anticipate changes before they occur;
empathy to understand that which cannot be clearly
expressed; wisdom to see the connection between
apparently unrelated events; and creativity to discover
new ways of defining problems, new rules that will make
it possible to adapt to the unexpected.
(42)
Reading Aristotle, Nozick, and Csikszentmihalyi
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together, then, these abilities may be seen to encourage,
permit and even compel rationally the individual to employ
these capacities in functioning within a society of other
human beings.

For purposes of this thesis, then, there are

three essentially human capacities that must be developed
and that are amenable to good or bad nurturance.

The first

such capacity is our capacity for thought: not just our
rationality (see, e.g., Nagel 1990, 7-14), but our
intuition and imagination as well.*

The second is our

capacity to communicate in symbols and concepts, our
ability to speak of more than pain and pleasure.

The third

is our social nature, which requires life with "parents,
children,

(spouse], and generally friends and fellow

citizens"

(Kullman 1991, 99).

From this, I take it as given that such an
individual is partly a product of the society in which he
or

she is born and grows and has the rational capacity and

knowledge to understand the benefits of the division of
effort and recombination of effort, in the form of
cooperative inquiry and action, to attain individual ends
within society (Mises 1966, 157-65).
In this thesis, the three essential capacities are
defined as follows:
Critical and creative thinking is that purposeful,
intuitive, imaginative and
self-regulatory process that
results in interpretative, analytical, evaluative,
inventive and constructive judgments, together with a
sound explanation of the evidential, conceptual,
understanding, systemic or methodological
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considerations upon which they are based.
Communicating in symbols and concepts is that mutually
purposeful, reflectively open process that results in
understanding, consensus, appreciation, illumination,
resolution, and elevation.
Cooperating in inquiry and action is concerted critical
and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and
concepts; and action aiming at the attainment of common
e n d s , together with an understanding of how to
complement one another's efforts, including, but not
limited to, cooperative action aiming at the free and
creative exploration of complex and subtle issues.

Optimal Performance and the
Essential Human Capacities
The goal of this thesis is to develop an
essentially human judgment process involving thinking,
planning, and acting as part of an autonomous, rational set
of meta-ethical principles that recognizes the value of
multiple perspectives in developing the understanding
necessary to achieve optimal performance (but see Lomasky
1987, 4 2 - 4 5 ).2

it is beyond the scope of this thesis to

fully develop the rich notion of "optimal performance,"
which is developed and documented by Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi in Flow: The Psychology of Optimal
Experience (1991) and The Evolving Self: A Psychology for
the Third Millennium (1993), but it will be helpful to
touch on the main conditions he describes and touch on its
relationship to what Peter M. Senge (1990) describes a
"creative tension."
In his books, Csikszentmihalyi presents what he
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describes as a "summary of the principles that make living
worthwhile"

(1993, xi).

Csikszentmihalyi describes the

rare state of consciousness in action that is both exciting
and involving.

He describes this state as "flow."

Aristotle argued that the truly virtuous would find
pleasure in doing the right thing at the right time in the
right way (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098al6-17; 2.6.1106b361107a2).

Csikszentmihalyi (1990; 1993), acknowledges

Aristotle (1990, 1) and suggests that if certain conditions
are met, one will experience flow, which he describes as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A sense of pleasure
A merging of awareness and action
A sense of control
An altered sense of time, which usually seems to
pass faster
A sense of harmony and growth
A sense that the experience is worth doing for its
own sake

Csikszentmihalyi lays out six conditions for flow to occur:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

It must be a meaningful activity for the agent;
The agent must know what has to be d o n e ;5
The project must present a balance of challenges
and skills,4 relative to that particular agent;
The environment must provide the opportunity for
the agent's concentration and involvement; and
There must be unambiguous feedback.
A sense that control is possible in principle.5

According to Csikszentmihalyi (1993), meaningful activity
includes:
1.

Purpose and vision, which identify us as a part of
the universal order and identify us with harmonious
growth;

2.

Challenges that allow us to express our potential,
to learn about our limits, to stretch our being.
(82)
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At first glance, these conditions appear to be too
narrowly focused, essentially unattainable, except for the
few closely bounded and rules-based activities that he
describes: rock climbing, chess, driving, and conversation.
Life is too complex, fluid, even chaotic for such
conditions to pertain.

However, an approach that refers to

a similar "feeling" derived from activity is Peter M.
S e n g e ’s notion of "creative tension."
Temporarily abandoning my scheme of not addressing
standards and criteria in favor of addressing capacities
and processes, one of Senge's five disciplines of the
"learning organization" is that of "personal mastery."

It

is "the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening
our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of
developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively"
(Senge 1990, 7).
1.
2.
3.
4.

It embodies four underlying movements:

continually clarifying what is important to us
continually learning how to see current reality
more clearly^
continually focusing on what one truly wants, that
is, on one's visions
having the character— e.g., the integrity and
courage— to hold, and stand for, a vision outside
of the social mainstream.
(141, 149)
When the foregoing is accomplished, Senge maintains

that there is a natural tendency to seek resolution that
tends to result in creative tension, that is, a force to
bring them together.

An accompanying result is emotional

tension, which is the state of anxiety that often arises
from creative tension.7

The essence of personal mastery is
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learning how to generate and sustain creative tension in
all aspects of our lives— and over the course of our
lifetimes— while managing the emotional tension that
accompanies it.8

One is committed to generating and

sustaining creative tension.

While holding this creative

tension, one remains clear on one's vision and continues to
inquire into current reality (211-12, 226).

One feels as

though one is a part of a larger creative process, which
they can influence but cannot unilaterally control (142).
Reading these together with Aristotle and
Csikszentmihalyi suggests the conditions for excellence
that more closely approximate life as we must frequently
live it.

Thus, the restated conditions of excellence

followed in this thesis are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

It must be a meaningful activity for the agent;
The agent must know what has to be done;
The project must present a balance of challenges
and abilities, relative to that particular agent;
The environment must provide the opportunity for
the agent's concentration and involvement;
There must be sufficient feedback to permit a clear
vision, an accurate, insightful view of current
reality, and reasonable expectations of the
possibilities of future action; and
A sense that influencing the creative process is
possible in principle.
This thesis, then, follows the conditions and

definitions of Flow and Creative Tension as necessary
components of Quality Action within the Essential
Interdependence Paradigm, which is developed in Part II,
Chapter 4.

It concludes with Aristotle, Csikszentmihalyi

and Senge, who wrote from different perspectives in time
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and space, that approaching life as an aesthetic
performance is a project of creating our own lives:
applying complex skills, leading to challenging goals;
going beyond what one has already achieved; and mastering
new skills, new knowledge, new understanding, new attitudes
(Csikszentmihalyi 1993, 180; Senge 1990, p a ssim).9
Summarized in the Essential Interdependence Paradigm as
"embracing change as an opportunity for learning and
growth," happiness is equivalent to individual excellence.

Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral Decision-making
Here, we distinguish between pragmatic, ethical,
and moral judgments, in a vein similar to that suggested by
Jurgen Habermas (1993).1°

It may be, as one of the

dominant texts in business ethics (Singer 1993) suggests,
that:
in everyday parlance, we interchange "ethical" and
"moral" to describe people we consider good and actions
we consider right. And we interchange "unethical" and
"immoral" to describe what we consider bad people and
wrong actions. (1)
Nonetheless, it appears to be of value to distinguish
between an ethical and a moral judgment, as set forth below
(see Williams 1985).
Though the tripartite division among judgments is
suggested by Habermas, the interpretation of all three—
pragmatic, ethical and moral— judgments used in this thesis
differ greatly from those of Habermas.

It is beyond the

scope of this thesis to set forth in detail the reasons why
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I think Habermas' definitions are faulty— and the
implications that flow from them, dangerous— but for the
most part, they are based on his analysis that all ethical
and moral judgments stem from discourse between the
affected persons.

Thus, he restricts ethical decision

making to the individual and moral decision-making to
judgments affecting others solely as developed through
discourse.

This thesis follows the more Aristotelian-

Hayekian notion of ethics as being a matter of
understanding "the better view" as incorporated

in custom

and tradition (the endoxa) and a more narrowly drawn notion
of morality following Immanuel Kant as an autonomous
rational process of determining the right thing to do among
autonomous, rational beings, especially those involved and
affected, as far as is reasonably possible (see also
McCollough 1991, 9-10J.11

Pragmatic Judgments
A pragmatic judgment involves making a rational
choice of means in the light of:
fixed purposes or of the rational assessment of goals
in the light of existing preferences.
[Here, o]ur will
is already fixed as a matter of fact by our wishes and
values; it is open to further determination only in
respect of alternative possible choices of means or
specification of e n d s . 1 ^
(Habermas 1993, 3)
A pragmatic judgment, for these purposes, is either ego- or
ethno-centric and is pursued solely from the perspective(s)
of the individual judgment maker(s).*3

The question asked
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in this context is, what must I do, in a particular
situation, to realize certain values or goals?

Ethical Judgments
An ethical judgment involves the values themselves;
it is a question of what is a good life for an individual
and for a community.

According to Habermas

(1993):

From this point of view, other persons, other life
histories, and structures of interests acquire
importance only to the extent that they are
interrelated or interwoven with my identity, my life
history, and my interests within the framework of an
intersubjectively shared life. My development unfolds
against a background of traditions that I share with
other persons; moreover my identity is shaped by
collective identities, and my life history is embedded
in encompassing historical forms of life.
To that
extent the life that is good for me also concerns the
forms of life that are common to us.
(6, citing Sandel
1982; see also Hall 1987)
Unlike pragmatic judgments, ethical judgments— and,
more broadly, policy or political judgments— are not fixed
with regard to values and the ultimate ends sought by
action.
(1)

Ethical judgments start from one of two premises:

that all members of a given organization or community

have certain shared values and views of, "What it is that
makes for a good life in the company of others" or (2) that
certain individuals, or a group of individuals, have at
least one shared end, that is, to determine what it is they
can, and must, mutually value in order to cooperate
successfully.
Ethical judgment, then, may be seen as the process
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of defining what a successful life is for a human being at
a particular time and place; determining ends, goals and
objectives one should strive to attain; identifying
appropriate means to reach appropriate ends; and developing
or discovering the values, principles, and tenets one
should apply in choosing among the competing means and ends
available to him or her.

As Mises (1966), declared:

Ethical doctrines are intent upon establishing scales
of value according to which man should act, but does
not always act.
They claim for themselves the vocation
of telling right from wrong and of advising man
concerning what he should aim at as the supreme good.
They are normative disciplines aiming at the cognition
of what ought to be.
(95)
So, ethical judgments, driven in part by ethical
doctrines, should be seen to operate as filters.

One type

of ethical judgment determines what ends should be pursued
and what ends should be rejected for an individual or
community to live a good life.

Another type determines

which means might be employed toward which ends, and which
means should be rejected.

Yet another deals with apparent

and real conflicts in choosing between otherwise
appropriate, but competing, ends and means.

Ethical

judgments as to ends, means, and values bring to the
decision-making process the product of earlier reflection
or deliberation— or the wisdom of accumulated experience,
either personal or social— that limited the range of ends,
means, and values deemed to be good.

This reflection or

wisdom usually involved that deemed conducive to the good

46
over the long-run: making it all the more valuable (and
hard to follow) in the short-run (see, e.g., Niebuhr 1932,
86-87).15
If the acting individual were free of any social
forces, we might follow Mises (1966) in declaring that:
In making his choice man chooses not only between
various material things and means.
All human values
are offered for option.
All ends and all means, both
material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base,
the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single row
and subjected to a decision which picks one and sets
aside another.
Nothing that men aim at or want to
avoid remains outside of this arrangement into a unique
scale of gradation and preference.
(3)
Despite having claimed that "all ends and all means, both
material and ideal issues" are "offered for option," Mises
acknowledges that:
The mores of their social environment are a power which
people are forced to consider.
Those recognizing the
spuriousness of the generally accepted opinions and
habits must in each instance choose between the
advantages to be derived from resorting to a more
efficient mode of acting and the disadvantages
resulting from the contempt of popular prejudices,
superstitions, and folkways.
(648)
Thus, this process applies even where the judgment maker is
not convinced that the end or means or values are correct,
but rather bows to the fact that they are endorsed by
others.
Ethical judgments are highly ego-centric and ethno
centric; they are concerned with the individual and social
goals accepted by that individual and that community at
that time and place.

Whether the society derives from a

"community of beliefs" or is one based on cooperation,
which has its own has its own intrinsic morality (Durkheim
1961 quoted in Giddens 1971, 76-77; see also Rorty 1992,
38-62), the sense of self operates to determine who one is
and who one believes that one should be.

This sense of

self, however, is bound up in tradition, being the
embodiment of the thoughts of others preserved through
language (Mises 1966, 176-77).

Ethical judgments, in this

sense, involve autonomous rationality, that is, the person
is self-legislating, but it is a subjective autonomy.
Though self-legislating and subjective, they are not
without limits.

First, the autonomous rationality of other

individuals, in that time or place must be respected.
Second, the actions of other acting individuals are data
that they must take into account in their actions.

Third,

those who contend that there is a conflict between the
autonomous purposeful actions of individuals or between the
autonomous purposeful actions of individuals on the one
hand and the commonweal on the other,

"cannot avoid

advocating the suppression of the individuals' right to
choose and to act" (730).
Ethical judgments are holistic in that they situate
a person squarely in the middle of his or her environment
and consider the "goodness" of the individual (or group) at
that time and that place (see, e.g., Nozick 70-71, 208 n.
11).

Further, this holism considers it to be "of the

essence" that a person doing the right thing does it
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habitually and cheerfully.1®

So, emotions and rationality

are considered relevant to an ethical judgment.

The

questions asked in this circumstance are, "Who am I [are
we], and who would I [we] like to be?"

And,

"Is it

'good'

for me [us] to act in a particular way in the long run, all
things considered?"

(Habermas 1993, 4-5; see also Solomon

1984, 3).

Moral Judgments
Jurgen Habermas suggests a distinction between
pragmatic, ethical and moral judgments that has some value
for purposes of this thesis, though I embrace the
distinction for reasons other than those given by Habermas.
At first, Habermas argues that a moral judgment is one that
asks the question,

"Whether I can will that a maxim should

be followed by everyone as a general

l a w .

"17

Though this

is formulated in terms of the Kantian categorical
imperative, Habermas later argues that a moral judgment, by
contrast, involves the examination of "our maxims as to
their compatibility with the maxims of others."!®

Here,

Habermas cites Kant as providing that a moral judgment
requires that "Everyone must be able to will that the
maxims of our action should become universal law."!9
thesis follows Habermas'

This

first formulation, but assumes

that a moral decision is one made by a rational, autonomous
person for articulable reasons that are "universal" because
any rational, autonomous person would have made that
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decision.

The question asked is, "Whether I can will that

a maxim should be followed by everyone as a general law"
(see also Nozick 1993, 5).20

Moral Process for Ethical Decision-making
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop
fully, but here we distinguish between universal laws
(moral law) that are procedural and may never be violated,
especially in making ethical judgments (maxims implemented
through empathy, patience, integrity and courage in a
particular place and time) and universal laws that are
substantive (not lying, not killing).

If we assume for the

moment that our capacities for critical and creative
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and
cooperating in inquiry and action are "of the essence" of a
human being, then we abuse the very capacities that make us
human beings if we violate the procedural laws.

For

example, under no circumstances— if we are to act as free,
dignified human beings— can we fail to honestly employ our
reason in our judgment processes, relying instead solely on
the views of others.

Under no circumstances— if we are to

act as free, dignified human beings— can we fail to afford
the time, energy and patience necessary to strive for
mutual understanding.

Under no circumstances— if we are to

act as free, dignified human beings— can we fail to
cooperate with others in inquiry and action in order to
develop a better understanding of reality and our abilities
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to create a future more in keeping with our purposes and
visions.

Even when qualified by "reasonableness ("as far

as is reasonably possible"), these same values apply to
determining what is reasonable under the circumstances.
In another context, Mises refers to this as the
alter ego problem.

In response to the empiricists,

behaviorists and positivists, Mises argues that, though it
cannot be proven, it is a workable proposition that:
there is only one "logic" that is intelligible to the
human mind, and that there is only one mode of action
that is human and comprehensible to the human mind.
(Mises 1966, 25)
So, Mises concludes that any workable world view or
ideology concerned with human action in the world as we
know it must operate under the principle that each of us
"deals with every other human being as if the other were a
thinking and acting being like himself" for the very
utilitarian reason that it works (24).
This suggests that there is a rational basis for
certain generally accepted "universal values" deriving not
from their beneficial consequences, but from the principle
that every human being must deal with every other human
being as a thinking, planning, and acting being.

Universal

values, such as honesty, promisekeeping, and civic
responsibility, can now be seen to be derived from a purely
rational theory of social cooperation.
These fundamental moral principles are open to
examination by reason and to demonstration by logical
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methods.

It follows from these that we must, to avoid

contradiction, think and act as though the other human
beings with whom we are dealing are thinking moral agents,
just as we are, even, or especially, when they advocate
different thoughts, feelings, and actions than would we.
If we treat other people as thinking moral agents
and if we are going to pursue our own purposes; visions;
and goals and objectives in the society of others, we
cannot expect to succeed over time unless we recognize that
they likewise have purposes; visions; and goals and
objectives of their own worthy of respect.

Moreover, even

(or especially) we should think of people as feeling moral
agents who must "reach out towards the discovery of the
value of life, not through the acceptance of standards of
good feeling, nor through the imposition of conceptions of
goodness upon his emotional life, but through the free
exercise of his own emotional life"
38-39).

(Macmurray 1962, 1992,

It follows from this that nothing may be permitted

to silence rational discussion and dialogue or reflection
and inquiry, but, far to the contrary, everything must be
attempted to promote such inquiry (see, e.g., Mill 1859,
1956).
Ten "universal" value statements developed by the
Josephson Institute of Ethics (1991) may be representative.
The Institute suggests ten statements that people from all
cultures, religions and communities would use to describe a
"good" person:
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1.

Honesty: being truthful, straightforward,
forthright, frank, candid.

2.

Integrity: being principled, courageous,
scrupulous, honorable, upright.

3.

Loyalty: being faithful and devoted, but not blind
obedience or unquestioning acceptance of the status
quo.

4.

Accountability: accepting responsibility, leading
by example, avoiding the appearance of impropriety.

5.

Fairness: being open-minded and impartial, avoiding
making arbitrary, capricious or biased decisions.

6.

Caring for Others: being courteous, prompt, decent,
preserving dignity and privacy of others.

7.

Respect: treating people with respect and honoring
their privacy.

8.

Promise-keeping: being trustworthy, reliable,
abiding by the spirit and letter of agreements.

9.

Responsible Citizenship: law abiding, opposing
unjust laws, exercising democratic rights.

10. Pursuit of Excellence: being committed, doing one's
best, maintaining one's competence.21
It appears that these universal values (as defined by the
Institute) are "universal" only insofar as they are
essentially procedural rules setting norms for translating
thought into action.

In other words, the "devil is in the

details" of applying these rules to situation in which one
finds oneself.
For example, there is no universal agreement on
"never lying" as Immanuel Kant suggested in his essay On
the Supposed Right to Lie Out of Love for Mankind (Jaspers
1962, 71-72).

However, there could be universal agreement
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with the proposition that in determining what is reality,
including the points of view of others, nothing is to be
gained by being dishonest.

This is so even if in following

the process one reaches the decision to lie under the
circumstances has concluded that the results of lying are
less severe than the results of not lying could be (e.g.,
lying as a social grace, lying to a killer asking for the
location of his intended victim).

One must have integrity

in pursuing the process of making a decision, though one
may act in a manner that might seem unprincipled under
other circumstances (e.g., paying bribes to have access to
a country to save lives).

Fidelity in the process of

determining reality is essential, though being unfaithful
where circumstances so dictate would reflect life in a
world not populated solely by other rational people (e.g.,
maintaining the attorney-client privilege as to past
crimes, but disclosing as to intended future crimes).
Though this smacks of ethical relativism, it should
not be seen as artificial to distinguish between universal
values in procedure and universal values in judgments.
Conceptually, there is great value in consciously
determining how thought would be applied in action in a
world populated by rational beings.

This describes the

substantive maxim to be considered, as well as a world that
fully nurtures and employs the Essential Human Capacities.
That the substantive maxim has to be modified or even
abandoned in the concrete world in which the individual
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thinks and acts serves to vividly reflect that ultimately
we are responsible through our choices for who we are and
the quality of the world around u s .

For this choice to be

rational, however, the ethical judgments that modify or
abandon the substantive moral judgments can only be arrived
at by following the procedural universal values.

The

substantive moral judgments in turn might only be
appropriate without modification in a wholly rational
world, e.g., Kant's Kingdom of Ends.
From this it follows that, in all our ethical and
policy decision-making, we should also test the pragmatic
judgment by testing it for its "essential humanity."

A

quality judgment that involves (and considers the impact
upon) that which is essentially human should result in
autonomous acting human beings who learn, have a sense of
community, and are of good character.
that a

Thus it is possible

pragmatic, essentially utilitarian,

judgment, may

be unethical in the sense that it has not considered the
Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or
affected, i.e., it is not essentially human.

Further, it

is possible that a judgment that is ethical may be immoral
because it is not universalizable beyond its time and place
and the Essential Human Capacities of all those involved or
affected.

Finally, it is possible that a moral judgment

may be unethical because it does not reflect the time and
place of the action, and the degree of Essential Human
Capacity development.22
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It is this distinction between the ethical and the
moral that explains much of the confusion in the area of
ethics.

As there is no universally accepted definition of

either the "ethical" or the "moral," for the purposes of
this thesis, an ethical (including policy)

judgment is one

that clarifies individual self-understanding, individual or
community values, or the notion of what is a good life for
that individual or that community.

Those judgments then

become the givens that pragmatic judgments strive to
a c c o m p l i s h .

23

Moral judgments, on the other hand, are

those arrived at through pure reason (based upon an
individual's own understanding of reality,) or pure faith,
based upon authority accepted on faith, which are
independent of his or her character and community's values,
goals or projects.

These commands are truly

universalizable throughout the kingdom of rational ends, or
by omnipotent and omniscient authority.
Such moral judgments may also provide procedural
rules used to regulate the processes of arriving at
pragmatic or ethical judgments.

Honesty and integrity (in

the sense of completeness or wholeness), for example, are
two values without which any other judgment is necessarily
flawed.

For example, to the extent communications or

reflection is not honest or whole, the arguments made, the
knowledge relied upon, and the actions taken are
potentially fraught with unnecessary risk.

These judgments

do not, however, suggest the conclusions to be reached in
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this context.

They do provide the basic rational values

that suggest how a rational society should organize various
end s .
Human action within a society that does not see the
value in ideal actions would be nonetheless considered
ethical, if embraced by the community.

That community

might, from another perspective, be immoral or even
unethical when it acts within a greater society, but its
actions would not be considered unethical within its own
values structure.
For example, from a purely rational point of view,
an autonomous individual could will that all commercial
transactions be conducted honestly without any puffing or
bargaining, since only the real value of a good or service
to the vendor could honestly be conveyed.

This would be a

moral command, a duty of a rational person in a community
of rational persons.

In the Middle East bazaar, however,

bargaining is expected and, indeed, its absence would deny
one of the joys in life.

Thus, this activity would not be

considered unethical, though in a purely rational sense,
neither ego-centered nor ethno-centered, setting a high
"asking price" is immoral.

This may explain why it is so

easy to agree as to the identity of "universal values," yet
so difficult to apply them.

Universal values are the way

we ought to act if everyone acted, or could be made to act,
that way.

But, since everyone does not act in accordance

with those values, it may be perfectly rational, at least
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from a short-term perspective, to act contrary to them.
Thus, the principal path to developing a "good" society may
be less in teaching universal values, than broadening
perspective, i. e., expanding consciousness and compassion
as means toward better choices.

Knowledge and Moral Behavior
It may be that social norms are irrational.

It may

be that over time, if everyone told the truth, even to
killers, the world would be a better place.

It may be that

taking personal responsibility for one's place in, and
understanding of, the world, dictates that one should
embrace fate, amor fati,24 rather than have someone
intervene to relieve oneself of the consequences of
decisions made.

But, there is yet another reason why that

which is "merely ethical" might be more "right" than a
purely moral judgment.
We, as individual human beings, create the world in
which we live.

Much that we "know" we cannot articulate,

as much knowledge is embedded in customs, traditions, or
practices.

If, however, deeply-held understandings of the

situation cannot be articulated, except in terms of
traditions or customs or practices, then a moral judgment
based upon all known communicable facts could not take into
account all of the relevant facts.

Without the knowledge

that is embedded in traditions or customs or practices, the
context can not be understood well enough for a rational
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decision to be made, hence intuition or imagination must
complete the thinking process.
Moreover, to the extent that knowledge is embedded
in traditions, customs, and practices, then an ethical
judgment apparently contrary to a moral judgment might be
the "right" decision under the circumstances.

Thus, the

values implicit in traditions, customs, or practices, which
seem irrational on their face, may actually translate
knowledge, otherwise unattainable, that make them quite
rational (see, e.g., Mises 1981, 95-105; Gray 1984, 28, 3639; Hayek 1989, 75-76).25
In the final analysis, applying a purely rational
maxim in the real world, where much that is knowledge
cannot be expressed or ascertained except through custom,
tradition, etc., may not be rational.

As Thomas E.

McCollough (1991) observed:
If what we know is reduced to technological
knowledge, it will exclude that which gives it meaning
and value and that which would enable human beings—
political beings— to appropriate it in humanly
meaningful ways. . . . The more bits and pieces of
knowledge are fitted together in social and technical
theory, the more necessary it is to relate them to the
intangibles, the tacit values, human qualities of
community.
(17)
McCollough quotes Michael Polanyi (1966, 61-62) saying:
traditionalism, which requires us to believe before we
know, and in order that we may know, is based on a
deeper insight into the nature of knowledge and of the
communication of knowledge than is a scientific
rationalism that would permit us to believe only
explicit statements based on tangible data and derived
from these by a formal inference, open to repeated
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testing.

(51)

As Friedrich A. Hayek (1989) observed in discussing
the famous John Maynard Keynes' justification for his
economic views:
The slogan that "in the long run we are all dead" is
also a characteristic manifestation of an unwillingness
to recognize that morals are concerned with effects in
the long run— effects beyond our possible perception—
and of a tendency to spurn the learnt discipline of the
long view.
(57)
Hayek (1978) anticipated this thought in his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech declaring:
If man is not to do more harm than good in his
efforts to improve the social order, he will have to
learn that in this, as in all other fields where
essential complexity of an organized kind prevails, he
cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make
mastery of the events possible.
(23-24)

Essential Human Truth
It remains to consider what the product of an
Essentially Human Judgment Process would be.

I have

already given it a name, Essential Human Truth; it is the
product of human action and human argument employing the
well developed, maintained, and employed Essential Human
Capacities.

As the product of an Essentially Human

Judgment Process, it follows that it would involve input
from all those involved in or affected by the judgment.
need now to consider what that input itself would be.
Essential Human Truth must be the product of an
Essentially Human Judgment Process that has as its input

We
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the desires, beliefs, and expectations of all those
involved or affected, which desires, beliefs, and
expectations are themselves evaluated in terms of the
Essentially Human Judgment Process.

That is to say that

all desires, beliefs, and expectations would not be given
equal dignity.

Desires, beliefs, and expectations would be

rationally criticized with the Essentially Human Judgment
Process as criterion at a minimum.
This is not to say that there is no room for
feelings, tacit knowledge, tradition or knowledge embedded
in practices in Essential Human Truth; it is only necessary
that they can be explained or put into perspective (see,
e.g., Damasio 1994, 18-20, Chap. 11; Macmurray 1962,

1992).

Further, as Thomas E. McCollough (1991) observes in another
context, imagination is a component of comprehensive
thinking in the form of "moral imagination:"
The moral imagination broadens and deepens the context
of decision-making to include the less tangible but
most meaningful feelings, aspirations, ideals,
relationships.
It encompasses the core values of
personal identity, loyalties, obligations, promises,
love, trust, and hope. Ethical judgment consists in
making these values explicit and taking responsibility
for judging their implications for action.
(17)
So it is that, though Essential Human Truth must be the
goal of any ethical and policy process, it will never be
fully rational or communicable.

It may remain buried in

feelings, language, customs, traditions, and institutions,
but it will be discoverable and explainable enough to be
put to use.

For example, with the expansion of global
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trade, a plethora of books on etiquette around the globe
has emerged for the business person.

The books seldom give

the "reasons" behind etiquette; it is enough that
compliance with the demands of etiquette is of great
instrumental value for successful international trade.
Through the development and use of the Essential
Human Capacities, this Essential Human Truth may be found
in what the accumulated and well-considered experiences of
those involved or affected suggest might work in the
struggle to create lives they truly desire to live.

Thus,

this approach is conservative in the sense that it honors
the past, yet liberal in that it requires that new and
broader perspectives be brought to bear on, "What we know
to be true."26

Bases of An "Essentially Human" Judgment Process
What is required, then, is a framework of the
individual within society that reflects a theory of action
and argumentation that is "essentially human" in concept,
process, and policy.

It would be a framework that fully

employs not only reason, but all of the essentially human
capacities employed to intuit, to dream, to make sense of
our world, to understand one another, and to function well
within the society of our choosing or our making.

Such a

theory of action and argumentation could be expressed in
the form of a framework that provides a set of assumptions,
considerations, understandings, strategies, principles, and
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practices to serve as foundations for the thinking,
planning, and acting that permits us to engage in
purposeful living.

For purposes of this thesis, I will

concentrate on the basic assumptions, considerations, and
understandings that underlie the practice of making
excellent pragmatic and ethical decisions rather than the
specific skills, principles, algorithms, or heuristics that
one would apply.

These also should be selected as proper

subjects of an Essentially Human Judgment Process, and are
well developed, across the human spectrum elsewhere.
There are a number of assumptions underlying an
essentially human judgment process.

First, it seems

appropriate that there be some process in which the
individual human life appears as the primary unit of
significance in arriving at quality judgments: pragmatic,
ethical, and moral (Meehan 1990, 8).

Second, because of

the inherent subjectivity of our individual wants, desires,
and purposeful actions, some relatively objective criteria,
which reflect the "essence" of humanity, should be employed
to evaluate both the process and the product of such
judgment.27

Third, this suggests that a focus on the basic

capacities that are essentially human, if not distinctively
human, might bring some degree of objectivity to an
otherwise subjective study.

Fourth, since our goal is

effective, efficient, and equitable policy— and since
policy requires thinking, planning, and acting— we might
limit the essences under consideration to those employed in
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those activities.

Basic Assumptions
There are a number of fundamental assumptions that
suggest the structure of this framework.

First, if we

value our rational nature, we are compelled to conclude
that we are responsible beings (1) who have unique purposes
and visions (see, e.g., Mises 1966; Meehan 1981, 5);28 (2)
who see "reality" from unique perspectives
Chap. 5);

(Damasio 1994,

(3) who make purposeful choices among

alternatives and act (Mises 1966); and (4) whose lives are
the consequences of those choices.

Second, if we value our

rational nature, there is no rational basis for not
respecting other rational beings and their purposes and
visions; their points of view; the choices they make; and
their right to make those choices (Mises 1966, 24).

Third,

freedom to think, plan, and act— alone and in voluntary
cooperation with others— is a necessary condition for a
rational and purposeful being to live his or her life.
Fourth, irrespective of human "nature" or the human
"condition," there are certain traits, characteristics, and
capacities that are "essentially human" that are employed
in any judgment process and are often adversely affected by
the implementation of a judgment made.

Fifth, human beings

who develop, maintain and employ these Essentially Human
Capacities flourish as persons.

Sixth, communities

composed of such persons are more apt to flourish as the
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individuals within them flourish.

Seventh, policies whose

ends and means employ and nurture the Essential Human
Capacities of all those involved or affected can be
expected to be more successful than those that do not.
Eighth, and more specifically, policies are more
successful, social organizations run more effectively,
efficiently, and equitably, and persons flourish because
employing the Essential Human Capacities results in Quality
Judgments

(as defined herein) which tend to encourage their

employment and nurture.

Finally, if we focus on the

Essential Human Capacities, then the judgment process we
seek should be one that (as far as is reasonably possible):
(1) consciously employs the Essentially Human
Capacities of all persons directly or indirectly
affected by a human action toward finding Essential
Human Truth;
(2) has as an ultimate goal the achievement of optimal
experience through the development, maintenance,
and employment of those essentially human
capacities; and
(3) expressly accounts for the extent to which a
judgment or action is less than essentially human
in either its understanding, making,
implementation, or evaluation, that is, in either
the process or the resultant policy.

Society and the Individual
Society— whether the family, an organization, or a
nation— has no life independent of the people composing it.
In this sense, society can be defined as "concerted action,
cooperation"

(Mises 1966, 144-45; see also Giddens 1971,
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76-77 and Elster 1985, 136-55).

If we see the individual

human being and collective human beings as engaged in
purposeful actions, then there is a reciprocal relationship
between the acts of the individual and the society as a
whole, as the acts (over time) ultimately define both the
individual and the society (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics;
Habermas 1993).
Society is characterized by the rational
appreciation of the benefits of a division of human effort
and the association of human effort on the part of each
individual that enables everyone to pursue his or her
interests more effectively and efficiently in society than
in isolation (Mises 1981, 418; Mises 1966, 143-45; but see
Hayek, Forward to Mises 1981, xxiii-iv).

Robert Nozick

(1993), following Friedrich A. Hayek, has observed that:
The social nature of our economic, intellectual, and
political lives enables us to benefit from imaginations
we do not ourselves possess— and no one can be equally
imaginative in all areas, if only because this requires
an alert attention we are limited in.
(174)
So, there is a knowledge component to the division of
labor, in that specialization focuses attention and
unleashes imagination and creativity.

In short, a

necessary consequence of a division of human effort— absent
fraud, coercion or force— is that the ends of the
individual can be best satisfied (or only satisfied)
through some degree of cooperation with those others who
supply the goods, services and relationships that meet
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those needs.

From this division derives what Emile

Durkheim (1961, quoted in Giddens 1971) described as,

"its

own intrinsic morality:"
we may thus say that the division of labour produces
solidarity only if it is spontaneous. But by
spontaneity we must understand not simply the absence
of express and overt violence, but of anything that
might, even indirectly, shackle the free employment of
the social force that each person carries in himself.
This not only supposes that individuals are not
relegated to particular functions by force, but also
that no sort of obstacle whatsoever prevents them from
occupying in the social framework the position which
accords with their capacities.29
(81)

What the Framework Should Look Like
If the foregoing set of assumptions were true, or
highly plausible, it would follow that a framework for an
ethical and policy judgment process should be characterized
by those "essentially human" aspects of the human
individual within human society.

If we divided the ethical

ends of policy decision-making, they would relate to
purposes, goals, and effects (see, e.g., Nagel and Mills
1993, 37-42): the well-considered purposes of all those
affected by the judgment; the well-considered goals implied
by those purposes of all those affected; and the effects of
the judgment, not only in reaching any set of goals, but
upon the Essential Human Capacities.

Failure to follow

such a framework should suggest that either one has failed
to employ the fullest human capacity or has ignored the
potential impact of the judgment upon the essentially human
traits, characteristics and abilities of the persons
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affected by the judgment.

Thus, the fundamental concept is

that, at least presumptively, an ethical and policy
judgment process applied by humans to make decisions
affecting other humans ought to employ the Essential Human
Capacities and consider the impact of the judgment upon the
Essential Human Capacities of the persons affected thereby,
as far as is reasonably possible.

Writer's Perspective on Ethical and Policy Matters
I approach this problem as one attempting to
develop a framework for understanding, analyzing, and
creating ethical private and public policies.

I come from

a strong existential, individualistic, classical liberal,
and free market perspective.

My perspective is strongly

influenced by the Austrian School of Economics, especially
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek.

But, I see this

as only the starting point: a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for the truly civilized society.
Such a society, in my view, requires a well-developed
character ethic; government limited to protecting the
society from the coercion and fraud of enemies, foreign and
domestic; a free market morality; and a vital role
recognized for an independent sector.30

The challenge, as

I see it, is not so much to describe what constitutes a
good life (or how an individual or society should live
one), but to describe a framework of the individual within
society that (1) allows a community to approach ethical and
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policy decision-making with a common frame of reference
emphasizing what is "essentially human,"

(2) permits the

rational treatment of those considerations that are
"ultimate givens"— individual happiness and the production
of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions (Mises
1966, 17-19);31 (3) has room for other ideological
assumptions not inconsistent with the framework itself;

(4)

encourages them to employ and nurture that which is
essentially human in all those affected by a judgment;

(5)

suggests the end product of applying such a process without
suggesting what specific ends should be sought or policies
adopted at any particular point in time or space; and (6)
provides a basis for developing transitional rules to
getting to the desired end state from where the community
finds itself.
As an ethical (rather than moral, as defined above)
judgment process, it is designed to take the members of a
family, organization, or society as we find them.

That is

to say, their preferences, values, beliefs, and capacities
are to be input into the decision-making process as they
exist.

Thus, the framework permits activities within one

society, reflecting their values or beliefs or the state of
their poorly developed capacities, that would be considered
unethical in another having different values or beliefs or
better developed capacities.

The principal virtue of the

framework is that it would not be conservative— in the
sense that it would accept any poorly conceived or
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communicated thought, feeling, or desire as of equal
dignity with a well-conceived or communicated thought,
feeling, or desire.

Moreover, it would expressly account

for the impact of any judgment upon the capacities
themselves.
In addition, I see my starting point as Nietzschean
in the sense that the Essential Interdependence Paradigm
chooses to affirm this life in this world, celebrating life
for what it is and may become, rather than condemning it
for what it is not, and/or cannot be.

Further, it adopts

his principle of "going beyond good and evil" as a struggle
for understanding.

Hence, honesty and integrity— rooted in

a firm belief in the need for ever increasing multiples of
perspective— might be said to be the Essentially Human
Virtues.

Though the framework is designed to achieve

excellence in living, it rejects violence and slavery as
necessary conditions for human excellence (see, e.g.,
Ansell-Pearson 1995, 43-44).
My approach is Aristotelian in nature, basing its
process and policies upon the development, maintenance, and
employment of certain essentially human traits,
characteristics and abilities.

Unlike the scholastics

alluded to in Chapter 1, I do not believe that there is an
"end" or essence to being human that precedes our
existence.

In this sense I am existentialist as described

by Jean-Paul Sartre in his famous 1945 speech,
"Existentialism is Humanism"

(1945, 1970, 31).
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I expressly reject the utilitarian school in so far as
it suggests that the end of all ethical and policy judgment
is toward happiness or pleasure or the greatest good for
the greatest number.

I embrace the Kantian school insofar

as it embraces rationality, freedom and autonomy, but
reject its approach to that which is moral as opposed to
that which is ethical as described above.

Civilization and Intervention
This thesis employs a number of definitions of
civilization.

First, following Robert Nozick and Friedrich

A. Hayek we may define "the degree of civilization as the
extent to which we benefit from the knowledge we do not
ourselves possess"

(Nozick 1993, 216 n. 59).

Second,

following Ludwig von Mises, who was describing the
philosophy of individualism: we may define civilization as
"social cooperation and the progressive intensification of
the social nexus"

(Mises 1966, 152).

The issue, of course,

is how to achieve civilized society without employing
coercion or violence.

Or, if a society is in such a state

that the people making it up can see no solution short of
coercion, then the goal is to apply no more coercion, for
no longer a period of time, and to no more people, than is
required.32
Throughout this thesis I will make occasional
reference to "the intervention required" to implement a
policy, especially one designed to develop and maintain the
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Essential Human Capacities.

It should be clearly

understood that, to a greater or lesser degree, all kinds
of "intervention"

(many generally considered quite

benevolent) require some degree of coercion.

However

subtle this "intervention" might be, it reduces the
autonomy of the persons acted upon to that degree.

Thus is

raised the issue of the ethics of intervention (see, e.g.,
Hall 1987,

193-97).33

For the purposes of this thesis, there are four
kinds of intervention: coercion, manipulation, persuasion,
and facilitation.

As all categories tend to be, these are

somewhat arbitrary and represent more points along a
spectrum than discrete forms of action.

An example of the

spectrum-like nature of them is given by David T. Beito
when he wrote of a medical society and state commission
"offensive to destroy the 'lodge practice1 evil," where
fraternal associations negotiated low per capita annual
fees for its membership.

Quoting researchers in the field

(Rosen 1977, 378; Burrows 1977, 128, 131), Beito writes:
The Committee on Contract Work of the Erie County, New
York medical society recommended "antagonistic
measures" against the contract practitioner "if
persuasion fails to convince him of his error."
(717)
Most of these terms are self-explanatory, but
contrasting manipulation, persuasion, and facilitation
might be instructive.

Manipulation is the practice of

controlling another (by means short of coercion), without
due regard for the Essential Human Capacities of another.

It has a substantive component in that there is some
conclusion that the other is expected to reach, or some
thing to do.

By contrast, persuasion is the practice of

influencing another, with due regard for the Essential
Human Capacities of another.
component.

It likewise has a substantive

Facilitation, on the other hand, has no

substantive component.

While the facilitator may convey

information of use to the other, facilitation is intended
to make the process of employing the Essential Human
Capacities more effective, efficient, and safe: to help
forward an Essentially Human Judgment Process.

Thus, for

example, mediation, as a process of facilitating the
resolution of conflict, is more "essentially human" than
litigation, which has elements of coercion, manipulation,
and persuasion, and even, sequestration.

State Action as Inherently Coercive
We are not speaking here of the state reserving to
itself the monopoly of coercion and violence to preserve
its society from enemies, foreign and domestic, that is,
"to safeguard the smooth functioning of social cooperation"
(Mises 1966, 722).

A basic assumption of an ethics

characterized by autonomous, rational judgment and action
is that society and state are essential means for all
people to attain their unique and private ends (148).
Hence, Mises

(though one of the foremost advocates of the

free market) argues:
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Seen from the point of view of the individual, society
is the great means for the attainment of all his ends.
The preservation of society is an essential condition
of any plans an individual may want to realize by any
action whatever.
Even the refractory delinquent who
fails to adjust his conduct to the requirements of life
within the societal system of cooperation does not want
to miss any of the advantages derived from the division
of labor.
He does not consciously aim at the
destruction of society.34
(165)
That there could be no mistaking his view of the role of
the state, Mises declares:
The state or government is the social apparatus of
compulsion and coercion.
It has the monopoly of
violent action.
No individual is free to use violence
or the threat of violence if the government has not
accorded this right to him. The state is essentially
an institution for the preservation of peaceful
interhuman relations.
However, for the preservation of
peace it must be prepared to crush the onslaughts of
peace-breakers. (149; but see Rothbard 1982)
Rather, when we speak here of intervention, we are speaking
of the application of state power in the public realm, or
manipulation, persuasion or sanction in the private realm,
that are inconsistent with the autonomy of the individual.
Most ideologies presuppose that within the social
system some figure has power to intervene or abstain from
intervening in individual and social action.

For example,

parents have power over children, the owner over employees,
and the state over those within its jurisdiction.

If

"freedom" refers to the sphere within which an acting
individual is in a position to choose between alternative
modes of action, one is free insofar as one is able to
choose ends and the means to be used for the attainment of
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those ends (Mises 1966, 279).

Conversely, a figure may be

said to have "intervened" where this freedom to determine
o n e ’s fate is restricted, directly or indirectly (287).
This intervention is always of the same kind
essentially, whether it involves the family, an
organization, a community, or a nation.

It may take the

form of "rules" of the house, the education of the young,
the requirement to do chores, and so forth.

It may take

the form of rules of the company; compulsory training,
education, and development; and limitations on privacy for
those voluntarily in the employ of an organization.

It may

take the form of health and safety codes in communities;
mandatory education in public schools; and taxation of
residents.

It may reach its most severe form in a draft

for the national defense.
One must not lightly accept coercion as legitimate
intervention, but there are circumstances that suggest that
it may be appropriate, provided that judgment is made
conscious of its potentially adverse effects from an
essentially human point of view.

Thus, coercion may be

appropriate under the following conditions:
1.

The situation is such that important values of the
community (including existence) are threatened;

2.

There is insufficient time or opportunity for the
Essential Human Capacities of those involved or
affected to be developed and/or employed; and

3.

No other form of intervention is reasonably
possible.
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Finally, if coercion is deemed appropriate and is employed,
the impact of the coercion upon the Essential Human
Capacities must be accounted for, as is the case with any
Essentially Human Judgment Process.
A simple example may illustrate the application of
these conditions.

As Aristotle did from time to time,

consider the Captain, crew, and passengers aboard a ship at
sea.

Learning that the ship is sinking and the crew has

manned the lifeboats, you are racing to save yourself when
you notice that two people are standing on opposite sides
of the ship.
with fear.

One has apparently panicked and is frozen
The other is the Captain of the ship, who has,

by all appearances, made a conscious decision to honor an
ancient tradition of the sea and go down with his ship.
For both the passenger and the Captain, important
values are at stake.

For both, existence is at stake, but

for the Captain there are other values, perhaps even tacit
knowledge, involved in the tradition of the Captain going
down with the ship.
passenger.

The contrary value is true for the

The Essential Human Capacities of the

passenger, in this situation, are overwhelmed by panic and
there is insufficient time to develop or employ them.

This

is not the case for the Captain, who, by all appearances is
perfectly aware of his or her situation and making a
considered judgment.

By all appearances no other form of

intervention would succeed in getting the panicked
passenger into a lifeboat in time to survive.

There is not
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time to exercise any other form of intervention with either
person in any event.

Finally, saving the passenger's life

and subsequent dialogue with him or her might have a
beneficial effect on the Essential Human Capacities of all
those involved and affected.

At the very least, human

existence is a sin qua non for their employment.
In this situation, coercion would be appropriate to
save the passenger's life as it meets all three conditions
and the impact is accounted for.

It would not be

appropriate, as developed, for the Captain.

For human

beings, there are values higher than mere existence.
Having risen to be a ship's Captain, his or her Essential
Human Capacities are presumptively well-developed and
apparently being employed.

There is insufficient time or

opportunity to employ any of the other forms of
intervention.
I am sensitive to the claim that the framework
might support intrusions into the lives of human beings
that are inconsistent with the development, maintenance,
and/or employment of the Essential Human Capacities in
general (cf. Hoppe 1989, Chap. 8), or in one country that
would be considered unconscionable in another country, in
particular.

However, I take comfort in proposing this

framework as one highly likely, if it were to become a
framework from which dialogue and discussion started, to
permit only legitimate intervention— limited in scope and
duration and to legitimate purpose.
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Conclusion to Part I
These three chapters have raised the challenge and
problem of ethics and policy decision-making, giving some
attention to the nature and severity of the problem.

They

have argued that the problem with existing methods is that
they have not been firmly rooted in an understanding that
different relationships suggest different approaches to
understanding.

They further suggest that what

fundamentally unifies various theories of ethics and policy
study is their requirement for w e 11-developed, maintained,
and employed Essential Human Capacities for the theories to
be well applied.
I have developed and defined certain assumptions
and concepts that underlie and define the structure of an
Essentially Human Judgment Process.

With these in mind,

and the need for an "essentially human" judgment framework
established,

I will develop the framework in Part II.
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Chapter Notes/3
1Annette C. Baier (1991), for example, argues that
David Hume urged "a turn from a one-sided reliance on
intellect and its methods of proceeding to an attempt to
use, in our philosophy, all the capacities of the human
mind: memory, passion, and sentiment as well as a chastened
intellect" (1; see also Howard 1982, 134-36).
^Lomasky (1987) argues against "autonomy, in its
extreme form," preferring his own concept of "an
independent project pursuer" (182-83).
For the control of
consciousness and its relationship to optimal performance
see Csikszentmihalyi (1991; 1993).
3 "Knowing t hat."
4"Knowing h o w ."
5V. A. Howard (1982), following John Dewey in part,
points to imagination "as the central element of control in
an ends-means continuum characteristic of creative
craftsmanship" (136).
^Note that the first refers to the result of a
process while the latter is the development of the
competencies and skills required to apply a process toward
a result.
There is an assumed competence for the first
"movement" and an assumed incompetence for the second
"movement" (Senge 1990, 141).
7Creative tension is a positive force, emotional
tension is a negative force that tends to predispose
ourselves to lowering the vision (ibid., 150-55).
As Mises (1966) has said in the context of action:
He who acts under an emotional impulse also acts.
What distinguishes an emotional action from other
actions is the valuation of input and output. Emotions
disarrange valuations. Inflamed with passion, man sees
the goal as more desirable and the price he has to pay
for it as less burdensome than he would in cool
deliberation.
(17)
^This learning is generative learning which is
defined as the ability to produce the results we truly want
in life.
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®See also Nietzsche on art in life and life as an
aesthetic performance:
Art is valued by Nietzsche for two main reasons;
firstly, because it enables human beings to endure life
in the face of the terror and absurdity of existence;
and secondly, it acts as the great stimulus of life,
encouraging human beings not to recoil from the horror
of existence, but to seek its furtherance and perpetual
self-overcoming.
(Ansell-Pearson 1994, 158-59).
l^In an earlier work, Habermas had contrasted the
"moral questions," that can be dealt with rationally and
which deal with universalization or justice, and
"evaluative questions" that can only be dealt with through
rational discussion within a concrete society and deal with
questions of the "good life" (White 1988, 48).
On the
difference between the ethical and the moral see also
Bernard Williams (1985, Chap. 10).
On the difference
between an ethics of justice versus an ethics of care see
Flanagan and Jackson (1987: 622-37).
H m c C o Ilough (1991) references a number of authors
who distinguish between:
the moral point of view as that in which one does
things on principle, universalizes one's principles,
and considers the good of everyone alike" and "visional
ethics" [that] has more to do with character, virtue,
vision, and the stories of the communities that shape
the moral life.
(9)
l^Habermas says these judgments are reached through
purposive "rationality."
l^Thus, the methodology followed here is
methodological individualism, singularism, and subjectivism
(see, e.g., Mises 1966, 41-43 (individualism), 44-46
(singularism), and 3, 21, 242, 395-96 (subjectivism)).
Methodological individualism is expressly opposed to
those who believe that the "only adequate method for the
scientific treatment of human problems is the method of
universalism and collectivism" (42). Methodological
individualism holds that the individual human being is a
social being, but that thinking, feeling, and acting can
only be understood as individual events:
As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his
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prehuman existence already as a social being. The
evolution of reason, language, and cooperation is the
outcome of the same process; there were inseparably and
necessarily linked together.
But this process took
place in individuals. . .. There is no other substance
in which it occurred than the individuals.
(43)
Singularism rejects "universalism, collectivism and
conceptual realism[, which] see only wholes and universals"
(45; see also Wilber 1995).
Singularism asks:
What happens in acting? What does it mean to say that
an individual then and there, today and here, at any
time and at any place, acts? What results if he chooses
one thing and rejects another?
(45)
Subjectivism, in this context, underlies what Mises calls
the
"general science of human action or praxeology.
According to this notion, the only standard that applies is
"whether or not the means chosen are fit for the attainment
of the ends aimed at" (21).
With regard to the choice of these ends there is no
question of truth; all that matters is value. Value
judgments are necessarily always subjective, whether
they are passed by one man only or by many men, by a
blockhead, a professor, or a statesman.
(395-96; but
see Hoppe 1993, Chap. 6)
^ P r a g m a t i c judgments should be seen as the purest
subject of what Mises calls the "Science of Human Action"
or
"Praxeology" (Mises 1966, 3,
7, 12, 21, 28-29, 32, 92,
142, 234.
It is a central tenet of this thesis that—
properly understood— ethical and moral judgments deal with
ultimate ends or values, but always, if the Essential Human
Capacities are given due consideration, take into
consideration the agency of all those persons affected by
the judgment.
Ethical judgments take into account people
as the judgment maker finds them.
Some forms of moral
judgments take into account all such other rational,
autonomous beings as the judgment maker is best able to
determine are involved or affected at that point in time
and space.
l5It is, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis
to consider why, in the heat of decision-making, we do not
follow our own ethical judgments as to what ends or means
are appropriate to pursue or which values to follow (see,
e.g., McIntyre 1990, 379-400; see also M. Smith 1995).
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l^Thus following an Aristotelian notion that "actions
in accordance with virtue must be essentially pleasant"
see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1.8.1099a22).
17This is but one of the three formulations of the
Kantian categorical imperative.
For all three formulations
of the categorical imperative, see Kant (1785, 1956, 7475).
l^This is a very different formulation from his
first.
Kant's goal in his ethics was autonomy of the
individual and freedom.
The universalization requirement
was born of rationality, hence his Kingdom of Ends, not an
application of democracy, in determining what was right.
19I know of no support for Habermas' statement at the
point cited, nor in any other part of The Groundwork.
20There is, of course, the notion of morality that is
derived from religious beliefs.
Such a distinction would,
of course, mark a clear distinction between the ethos of a
given community and the revealed word of God (see, e.g.,
Novak 1993; Neuhaus 1992).
23-The ten consensus core values were reorganized into
the "Six Pillars of Character" in the 1992 edition.
22The easiest cases, of course, are those where a
pragmatic judgment is unethical or immoral.
As we will see
in Chapter 8 (Application and Policy Implications), this is
the typical case in public policy making today.
23por the difference between intentional and
deliberative perspectives on intentional action see, e.g.,
M. Smith (1995, 131-33).
24This was Nietzsche's (1967) "formula for greatness"
(10); see also Danto 1965, 21,34, 212-13.
for the
comparable notions in Eastern philosophy see Danto (1987):
Buddhist theory (81-82) and the Bhagavad Gita (91-93).
25a s to the difference between desiring and valuing
see M. Smith (1995, 133-36).
2*>rt is beyond the scope of this thesis to
investigate how closely this approximates the
"perspectivism" of Nietzsche (but see Danto 1965, Chap. 3;
Sleinis 1994, Chap. 2).
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2 7 it is beyond the scope of this thesis to treat Ken
Wilber's (1995) notion of both processes and things
(products) as "holons" (whole/parts), though it is thought
provoking and worthy of consideration both supporting and
limiting the notion of an Essentially Human Judgment
Process (see. e.g., 35-40).
28j4eehan divides these purposes into three, that he
terms: anticipation, control, and choice.
^ D u r k h e i m — though he believed that neither family,
religion, nor government could provide the necessary
"moral" regulation— nonetheless believed that some such
regulation was required.
He proposed a council of
industrial and professional associations (see Hall 1987,
Chap. "Social Theory as Intervention"; see also 150-51).
30The latter— a we 11-developed independent sector
taking up where the government has no role and the free
market either does not or fails to operate— is absolutely
essential for a society to be truly civilized (see, e.g.,
Cornuelle 1993; Olasky 1992; see also Beito 1990).
I leave
for another day just how 'independent' our independent
sector is today.
See, e.g., Merline (1995):
"We believe that only the government has the resource
capacity [read power to tax]— not to mention the final
political and moral responsibility in justice— to
promote the general welfare," said the Rev. Fred
Kammer, president of Catholic Charities USA [$1,225
billion in government grant money, or 65% of revenues
in 1993], the largest charity in the country [emphasis
added]."
(A1-A2)
31-Mises (1966) notes, for example:
Reason and experience show us two separate realms: the
external world of physical, chemical, and physiological
phenomena and the internal world of thought, feeling,
valuation, and purposeful action.
No bridge connects-as far as we can see today— these two spheres.
Identical external events result sometimes in different
human responses, and different external events produce
sometimes the same human response.
We do not know why.
(18)
See also Dewey (1929):
Values are values, things immediately having certain
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intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is
accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are.
(321)
33t . Alexander Smith (1988) notes that the
intervention of government affects the time preferences of
those affected by the intervention, since short-run gains
come to be seen as more readily available through such
intervention than the effort required to make them through
one's own efforts.
This creates rising expectations as to
the benefits of political action (19, 101-03, 246).
33See also Riane Eisler (1987) who distinguishes
between "domination hierarchies . . . based upon force or
the implied threat of force" and "actualization hierarchies
[whose] function is to maximize the organism's potentials."
[HJuman hierarchies based on force or the threat of
force not only inhibit personal creativity but also
result in social systems in which the lowest (basest)
human qualities are reinforced and humanity's higher
aspirations (traits such as compassion and empathy as
well as the striving for truth and justice) are
systematically suppressed.
(205 n. 5)
^ T h o u g h widely considered one of the champions of
the free market, Mises (1966) expressly rejected anarchism
(148-49) and natural law as the foundation for his science
of human action (174, 720), though he appears to recognize
a notion of laws of nature expressed in physical phenomena
and the connectedness between human reason and action (761;
cf. Rothbard 1982, 205 et seq.; Hoppe 1993, Chap. 6).

PART II

THE ESSENTIAL INTERDEPENDENCE PARADIGM

CHAPTER 4

ASSUMPTIONS, CREATIVITY & PARADIGM

The human being faces the world as he or she sees
it.

He or she strives, consciously or unconsciously, to

recreate it as an aesthetic and/or ethical performance.
Ultimately, the arts of living as well as can be— toward
life plans as well-made as can be— are the creative tools
at issue here.

The tasks facing him or her are three-fold:

to assimilate an already known reality, to accommodate
himself or herself to a reality at odds to the subject, or
to transform reality.

The issue met by this framework,

then, is, How does one develop a balanced system of
assimilation, accommodation, and transformation leading
from knowledge to action within the context of a world of
both cultural and natural objects?3

Primary Action-guiding Assumptions
There are a number of primary normative assumptions
that would lead one to believe that there can be an
84
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effective ethical and policy judgment process that might
aptly be labeled "essentially human" and that suggest the
possible implications for measurement and general policy
prescriptions.

Thus, among the normative assumptions that

follow, assumptions Al through A10 suggest what the process
might be; assumptions All through A15 suggest the criteria
to be employed in determining the essentially humanity of
the process,
A.

judgment, and action taken on them.
Assumptions (herein referred to as "A") that point

to what the process might be:
Al
The individual human being is a selfcomprehending, essentially social being whose rational,
communicative, and social capacities characterize the
"essentially human" life.
A2
Any essentially human judgment process, and
the product thereof, ought to reflect those capacities
most characteristically or essentially human.
A3
The specific
characteristically or
critical and creative
symbols and concepts;
action.

skills reflecting
essentially human capacities are
thinking; communicating in
and cooperating in inquiry and

A4
An essentially human judgment process must
include understanding to grasp what is going on in the
minds of the persons involved or affected.2
Understanding [herein referred to as "U"] is important
because:
U1
It establishes to one's own
satisfaction the fact that an individual or group of
individuals engaged in an action— motivated by certain
value judgments— aimed at certain ends, and that they
applied for the attainment of these ends means
suggested by certain technological, therapeutical, and
praxeological doctrines.
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U2
It tries to appreciate the effects and
the intensity of the effects brought about by a
definite action; it tries to assign to every action its
relevance, i.e., its bearing upon the course of events
(Mises 1966, 50-55).3
A5
There is a continuity between the acquiring
of knowledge, the having of knowledge, and the using of
knowledge.
Thus, "knowledge," in the strict sense of
something possessed, consists of our intellectual
resources that enable us to adapt the environment to
our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the
situation in which we live (Dewey 1916, 344; see also
Dicker 1976).
A6
Human institutions, practices, and cultures
are, for the most part, "self-organizing and selfreplicating structures [that] arise without design or
even the possibility of design, such that knowledge of
some of the elements of these structures allows the
formation of correct explanations about the structure
(herein referred to as "S") of the whole" (Gray 1984,
31).^ This principle has three elements:
51
The "invisible-hand" thesis— Social
institutions arise as a result of human action, but not
always, or wholly, from human design (see, e.g.,
Mandeville 1732, 1924; see also Gray 1984, 33-4; Shand
1990).
52
The "primacy of tacit or practical
knowledge" thesis— Our knowledge of the world, and
especially of the social world, is embodied first of
all in practices and skills, and only secondarily in
theories, and at least part of this practical knowledge
cannot be articulated.
53
The "natural selection of competitive
traditions" thesis— Traditions are understood to refer
to whole complexes of practices and rules of action and
perception and the claim is that there is a continuous
evolutionary filtering of these traditions under the
requirements of adaptability.
A7
The distinctive reasoning of the acting human
being is that "action necessarily always aims at future
and therefore uncertain conditions and thus is always
speculation" (Mises 1966, 58; cf. Dewey 1980, 145; see
also Dewey 1929, 15).
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A8
The responsibilities of different kinds of
relationships yield different ethical preoccupations,
methods, priorities, even concepts (Card 1990, 199200 ).
A9
The Essential Human Capacities tend to be
developed, maintained, and employed more through
informal and personal relationships than through formal
impersonal relationships.
A10
Essential Human Excellence is a practice that
employs the essential human capacities, over time,
under such conditions, and in such a manner that a
person develops the ability to master consciousness,
itself, in order to take control of his or her own
life.5 There are six necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions for essential human excellence (herein
referred to as "E"):
El
Meaningful activity (a bundle of
opportunities for action, or "challenges"), which is
goal-directed and bounded by clear rules for action;
E2
Skills, knowledge, understanding, and
attitude appropriate to what must be done;
E3
Challenges that are well-matched by a
person's ability to employ the Essential Human
Capacities;
E4
A situation that provides the
opportunity to become concentrated and involved;
E5
Sufficient feedback to permit a clear
vision, an accurate, insightful view of current
reality, and reasonable expectations of the
possibilities of action.
E6
A sense that influencing the creative
process is possible in principle.
B.

Assumptions regarding measurement of the essential

humanity of the process, judgment, and action:
All There
is no standard unit for measuring the
desirability of human lives; no single concept or
variable adequately represents human life; each human
life is, to a greater or lesser degree, unique; and
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preferences and priorities cannot be tested (Meehan
1990, 111).
A12
Value is the importance that an agent
attaches to ultimate end s . Means are valued
derivatively according to their serviceableness in
contributing to the attainment of ultimate ends.
Value
is not intrinsic; it is not in things.
It is within
u s ; it is the way in which a person reacts to the
conditions of his or her environment (Mises 1966, 96).
A13
There are two distinct human capacities to
measure physical events and human events (herein
referred to as "K"):®
Kl
For physical and chemical events there
exist constant relationships between magnitudes,
capable of human discovery and measurement with
precision.
K2
For essentially human events there are
no constant relations between magnitudes capable of
human discovery and measurement with precision
(Nicomachean Ethics 1.3.1094b21-25; Mises 1966, 55).
A14
Though not constant, the character of a
relationship can be determined and measured to a
relevant degree (hereinafter referred to as "R"):
Rl

Formal and impersonal

R2

Informal and personal

R3

Informal and impersonal

A15
Happiness is a consequence of excellence
and includes, but is not limited to, the following
feelings (herein referred to as "F"):
Fl

A

sense of pleasure

F2

A merging of awareness and action

F3

A

F4

An altered sense of time, which usually
seems to pass faster, or "timelessly,"
in engrossment or ecstasy

sense of control of one's life
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F5

A sense of harmony and growth

F6

A sense that the experience is worth
doing for its own sake

Creativity and Quality Action
One major definitional task remains, setting the
relationship of the Essential Human Capacities to
creativity, which, for purposes of this thesis, might be
called the "craft" of artistry in life.

We will be looking

at what is required to generate or create the lives we
truly desire to live.

As V. A. Howard (1982) suggests:

In the end, for artist, artisan, or athlete, it is a
matter of finding the right response, the "better way"
of doing things.
Practitioners in these areas
instinctively grasp the significance of critical,
creative, imaginative skill in the quest for a better
way, though seldom with the intention of producing a
better theory of craft.
(189; see also Macmurray 1962,
1992, 14-15)
While this thesis follows the classic distinction
between the good, the true, and the beautiful, it has as a
goal the development of a framework to aid us in creating
the lives we truly want to live— presumptively,
are subjectively good, true and beautiful.

lives that

In this vein,

Richard Shusterman (1992) has interpreted, and expanded
upon, a cryptic assertion by Ludwig Wittgenstein, that
"ethics and aesthetics are one and the same"

(Ludwig

Wittgenstein 1921, 1963, 6.421, quoted in Shusterman 1992,
236).

Shusterman believes that Wittgenstein was asserting

the idea that ethics and aesthetics were fundamentally the
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same in at least three significant respects:
1.

Both involve seeing things transcendentally, with
the whole world as background;

2.

Both concern the realm of the mystical as both
employ a "transcendental global perspective"; and

3.

Both are essentially concerned with happiness.

While these hardly establish that ethics and aesthetics are
"one," they do establish a unifying theme that Shusterman
developed as pointing to the need for broader perspective
based upon the world as it is, with a goal of happiness in
social life.
Shusterman uses Wittgenstein's ambiguous dictum as
a point from which to inquire into the relationship between
ethics and asethetics, concluding by "erecting the
aesthetic as the proper ethical ideal, the preferred model
and criterion for the good life" (Shusterman 1992, 237).
After treating various modern approaches to ethical theory,
he concludes that ethical and aesthetic judgments:
should not be the outcome of strict application of
rules but the product of creative and critical
imagination.
Ethics and asthetics become one in this
meaningful and sensible sense; and the project of an
ethical life becomes an exercise in living
aesthetically [emphasis added].
(244)
For purposes of the Essential Interdependence
Paradigm, it is assumed that all three capacities are
involved to a greater or lesser degree in creativity.
is so because, as developed below, creativity is a
systemic, rather than purely individual, accomplishment

This
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requiring social capacities.
It is important to distinguish why creativity
should be seen as a function of all three capacities,
rather than simply intelligence.

Here, I follow David H.

Feldman, a coauthor of Changing the World: A Framework for
the Study of Creativity (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and
Gardner 1994) in defining, what he (Feldman 1994) terms,
"'Big' creativity" to mean:
the purposeful transformation of a body of knowledge,
where that transformation is so significant that the
body of knowledge is irrevocably changed from the way
it was before.
This kind of transformation can be
accomplished conceptually, as in the case of proposing
a new theory, or by making new products or
representations, developing new technologies, or
proposing innovative practical techniques.
(86)
Thus, when a body of knowledge, or domain, is reorganized,
both qualitatively and irreversibly, creativity is deemed
to have occurred (87).
There are, of course, many other definitions of
creativity.

At first glance, Feldman's notion of

creativity appears to be too demanding, too far beyond the
norm to be a model for ethics and policy study for us all,
and it i s .

Feldman and his colleagues aimed at Big

creativity, that is, "the kinds of things that people do
that change the world" (Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and
Gardner 1994, 1-2).

Their study is expressly not aimed at

"small' creativity . . ., the more humble (but perhaps
equally vital) tendency to bring a fresh and lively
interpretation to any endeavor, whether humble or exalted"
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(2).

For purposes of this thesis, we too are seeking

something more than small creativity, though something less
than big creativity.

We are seeking something that we

might call "generative activity," the kinds of things that
people do that create the lives they truly desire to live
(see Senge 1990, 14, 22, 142, 187, 206, 286).
The kind and degree of creativity in individual
lives has been problematical in the literature, since
aesthetic creation has been considered to be limited to a
narrow elite.

Shusterman (1992), for example, treats a

variety of philosophical approaches to creativity,
especially Richard Rorty's (1986; 1989), and tentatively
concludes with Rorty that the aesthetic life is, for the
most part,

"a distinctly private ethic, essentially

independent of the public ethics of social life" and that
"no philosophy or theory can synthesize the 'private' goal
of self-creation with the public one of social solidarity"
(Shusterman 1992, 255, quoting and interpreting Rorty 1989,
xiii-xiv).

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to

develop this debate further, but Shusterman, having
reviewed the theories of Richard Rorty, notes:
Rorty explicity urges us to see the prime value and
"aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens
be as privatistic, 'irrationalist,' and asetheticist as
they please so long as they do it on their own time—
causing no harm to others and using no resources needed
by those less advantaged.'"
(239)
Shusterman concludes by making an excellent case for a
renewed examination of creativity and its relationship to
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ethics and politics to achieve a notion of "living beauty"
offering "not so much a final solution but a 'program for
more work'"

(255-61).

The tie between the attribute of human
consciousness and one's ability to create the life one
truly desires to live, that is, one's capability to make
choices and effect changes, is developed in the Feldman,
Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner (1994) notion that:
The uniquely human ability to reflect upon the
state of the world and of one's own capabilities and
make changes in them is perhaps the most dramatic way
in which humans differ from other organisms.7
(29)
Similar to our discussion of Flow and Essential Human
Excellence, David H. Feldman, Howard Gardner, and Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi declare that their notion of creativity
"assumes a quality of purposefulness, an unusual set of
talents, and probably optimal circumstances for developing
those talents in a distinctive direction"

(86).

Moreover,

since they consider even a field such as synchronized
swimming to be worthy of study in their work on creativity,
I assume that what I have styled "generative creativity"
must require many of the conditions for creativity they
describe.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop
fully the tripartite framework of the person, the domain,
and the field that Feldman and his colleagues have
developed for further study in the field of human
creativity, but a few observations are necessary to flesh
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out the notion of Quality Action developed herein.
assumes three aspects of the creative person:

Feldman

"a quality of

human purposefulness, an unusual set of talents, and
probably optimal circumstances"

(1994, 86).

First, to

Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner (1994), creativity
is purposeful:
an ability to reflect on experience, both from inside
and outside the skin, as well as a tendency to believe
in the possibility of making changes to better achieve
ends.
(31)
Second, Feldman (1994, 86) assumes an unusual set of
talents.

This would be for purposes of big creativity.

For the purposes of the Essential Human Paradigm, the
minimum required talents include well-developed (or
facilitated) Essential Human Capacities, a cognitive
orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation
(see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi 1994, 147).8

Third, Feldman

(1994, 86) assumes optimal circumstances.

Later,

Csikszentmihalyi (1994, 135) suggests that these optimal
circumstances include being part of a creative system,

"the

social and cultural context in which the "creative" person
operates."
Thus, creativity is a systemic phenomenon:
But even in the best of cases, when real-life adult
accomplishments are evaluated by experts, judgments are
based on criteria that cannot be separated from current
values and norms.
Hence one must conclude that
creativity is not an attribute of individuals but of
social systems making judgments about individuals.
(144)
For the most part, then, all attempts of the human being to
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develop knowledge and act upon it in order to assimilate,
accommodate, or transform reality is essentially a systemic
function.
Csikszentmihalyi (1994) lists a number of questions
that help describe the impact of the field, or community,
on creativity.

These may be stated, in terms of the

Essential Interdependence Paradigm, to be:
1.
Is the main concern of the community to preserve or
change the community?
2. How many variations is the community equipped to
recognize?
3. What are its resources for controlling the rate of
individual variations?
4. What are its selection criteria concerning new
variations?
5. What is the status of the community relative to
other communities in the social system?
6.
Is the community autonomous, made up of persons
controlling their own destiny, or is it controlled by
external institutions?
(152)
Since human institutions rise and develop through
human action, but not always or wholly through human
design, there is a predictable, though perhaps
unquantifiable, loss in human creativity when a minority of
a community arrogates to itself the right to set standards
for creativity, which interferes with the creativity of
individuals.

To this list, then, should be added the

question, To what extent is human creativity stifled by the
control of the community?
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For purposes of the Essential Interdependence
Paradigm, therefore, generative creativity is assumed to be
a fundamental aspect of Quality Judgment, but neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition of any particular
judgment.

Generative creativity involves a quality of

human purposefulness that impels the individual to create
the life he or she truly desires to live.

This, in turn,

requires that the individual's Essential Human Capacities
are well enough developed and employed to be able to
effectively assimilate, accommodate or transform the world
around him or her.

Finally, he or she must have surrounded

him or herself with a supportive community.

Essential Interdependence Paradigm.
This framework of the individual within society,
which employs and accounts for the Essential Human
Capacities, is called the Essential Interdependence
Paradigm.

It stands in contrast to any number of other

paradigms that treat the individual as a subordinate part
of society (see, e.g., Giddens 1971; Etzioni 1988) or which
make unreasonable assumptions regarding human capacities,
especially knowledge.

The Essential Interdependence

Paradigm refers to the processes and policy considerations
necessary to the use

and development of those capacities

of

agents acting within

society, which are "of the essence"

of

humanity and which, correspondingly, are "essential" to
living the good life in society, irrespective of how one
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defines it.

It includes what is called an Essentially

Human Judgment Process and the impact of pursuing such a
process within a community over time.

This framework can

be expressed verbally as follows:
Where a judgment process (as far as is reasonably
possible) employs— and accounts for the effects of a
proposed judgment on— the Essential Human Capacities of
all persons affected by a judgment, there results
Quality Judgment.
The judgment process itself will
consider (a) the time available to employ the process,
(b) the time frame(s) within which the judgment is to
be effective, and (c) the differing time value
orientations of all those affected.
Where Quality Judgment is implemented by persons
for whom the project is a meaningful activity and there
is a balance of challenge and ability; an opportunity
for concentration and involvement; sufficient feedback
to permit a clear vision, an accurate, insightful view
of current reality, and reasonable expectations of the
possibilities of action; and a sense of the possibility
of control of one's life, there results Quality Action.
The action process itself must provide enough time for
the actors (a) to employ their Essential Human
Capacities in reaching augmenting Quality Judgments,
(b) to implement the resulting Quality Judgments, and
(c) to reflect on the experience in order to consider
its long-term impacts and learn from it.
If the norms of Quality Judgment and Quality Action
are followed over long enough periods of time, there
results change in behavior, and, if the changed
behavior becomes the custom of the community, there
result autonomous agents of good character, who embrace
uncertainty and change as opportunities for learning
and growth and who comprise a community having shared
vision and core values consistent with the development
and maintenance of the Essential Human Capacities.
The Essential Interdependence Paradigm requires
diligent accounting for the development and employment of
the Essentially Human Capacities of all those affected
thereby.

This standard applies no matter what the type of

judgment (e.g., moral, ethical, or pragmatic), what part in
the management process the judgment is made (e.g., pathfinding, problem-solving, or implementing)(see Leavitt
1989, 33-42).^ or whether it is the judgment process, the
judgment itself, the implementation process, or the
consequences upon implementation that are to be evaluated.
Under such a system, the process and policy are integrated:
that which characterizes the process, also characterizes
the policy.

Finally, the process and its judgments are

parts of a framework of human action within society that
aids in understanding past human events and in projecting
future human events and their consequences.

It allows

ethical and policy judgments to reflect the life-histories
and life-worlds of the decision-makers while applying
universalistic norms, essentially rational, to the
procedure itself and to the policy insofar as it affects
the capacities of those affected by the judgment (Habermas
1993, 171-72).

In short, it allows the individual to

assimilate, accommodate, or transform more successfully the
world he or she sees.

Conclusion and Preview
I have described the basic assumptions underlying
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm, with a special
emphasis on creativity, and described the framework itself.
I turn now to a brief description of the capacities that I
assume, for purposes of this thesis, to be "Essential Human

Capacities" in Chapter 5, and of the various aspects of
time and the concepts of Quality Judgment and Quality
Action in Chapter 6.
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Chapter Notes/4
^This approach is based upon the Feldman adaptation
of Piaget's theory of equilibration of knowledge (Feldman
1994).
^Mises distinguishes between knowledge of physical
phenomenon, conception, and understanding (Mises 1966, 50).
A related aspect of knowledge is the concept of "tacit
knowledge" or "fragmented knowledge" (see, e.g., Gray,
1984, 28, 37, 82-83).
^Mises (1966) declares, e.g., "Acting man looks, as
it were, with the eyes of a historian into the future"
(58).
^This is based upon the notion that knowledge is
essentially practical knowledge.
As such it is embedded in
practices, institutions, language, habits, customs, and
traditions. Much of it is only dimly understood and cannot
be articulated.
So, theory, models, and frameworks such as
this one, can never be more than abstract and speculative
as to what patterns have occurred in the past, and might
occur in the future.
^For the control of consciousness and its
relationship to optimal performance see Csikszentmihalyi
(1991; 1993).
6It is assumed that there are three dimensions of
experience: perceptual objects that are really existing
things or events; all other objects that may or may not
exist, may have existed but no longer exist, and that do
not exist but may exist in the future; and the subjective
experiences that exist only for the individual mind that
has them (Adler 1985, 29).
7This supports the notion that such reflection or
consciousness might be considered an "essential" human
capacity or attribute.
For the purposes of this thesis, it
will be considered the capacity that compels the
development of the Essential Human Capacities, or an
attribute of humanity, which requires the capacities to be
developed itself.
^Csikszentmihalyi (1994) discusses the relationship
between personality traits and values, cognitive
orientation toward discovery, and intrinsic motivation in
"The Domain of Creativity."
He also refers to discovery
orientation as "problem finding orientation" (147).
In a
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related vein regarding problem definition, see Rochefort
and Cobb (1994).
^According to Leavitt: implementing is about "acting,
changing, doing"; problem-solving is about "analysis,
thought, reason"; and path-finding is about "vision,
innovation, mission" (Leavitt 1989, 34).

CHAPTER 5

CAPACITIES CONCEPTUALIZED

Capacities Characterized as
"Essentially Human"
The first capacity among equally "essentially
human" capacities would seem to be critical and creative
thinking.

This capacity is best employed, however,

(and

perhaps only w e 11-employed) within a context of social
cooperation in the form of effective communication and
cooperative inquiry and action among and between all those
involved in, and affected by, a judgment of quality.

Thus,

we will discuss the other two capacities— communicating in
symbols and concepts, and cooperating in inquiry and
action— before turning to critical and creative thinking.

Significance of symbolic communication
Symbolic communication can be seen as an
essentially (though not exclusively)1 human process for two
reasons:

(a) the individual human develops his or her

"sense of self" within the broader community through
symbolic communication and (b) the human environment, as
opposed to the physical environment, is the construction of
communicating humans.
102
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The human becomes "human," in the sense of being
self-conscious, through language.

This first concept is

best illustrated by the work of George Herbert Mead, as
interpreted by Jurgen Habermas (1991):
A person is a personality because he belongs to a
community, because he takes over the institutions of
that community into his own conduct.
He takes its
language as a medium by which he gets his personality,
and then through a process of taking the different
roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the
attitude of the members of the community.
(159)
Thus, Habermas declares that:
The formation of identity and the emergence of
institutions can now be approached along the following
lines: the extralinguistic context of behavioral
dispositions and schemes is in a certain sense
permeated by language, that is to say, symbolically
restructured.
Previously, only instruments for
reaching understanding were transformed into signals,
into signs with conventionally fixed meanings; at the
stage of normatively guided action, however, the
symbolism permeates even into motivation and the
behavioral repertoire.
It creates both subjective
orientations and suprasubjective orientation systems,
socialized individuals, and social institutions.
(160)
The human environment is a construct of
communication.

The notion of communicating in symbols and

concepts ties together a number of concepts.

First, human

action is purposeful behavior aiming at the attainment of
definite ends (Mises 1966, Chap. I) and based upon each
human being's subjective understanding of e x p e r i e n c e ^ and
the meaning each ascribes to a thing or event.

Second,

human beings are "capable of argumentation and hence know
the meaning of truth and validity"

(Hoppe 1993, 152).
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Third, while the meaning is, in some sense, unique to each
individual, the words with which we think are a social
phenomenon^ and the significance of things and events are
the result, in large part, of our social interactions.
Fourth, meaning is a function of perception, reason, and
understanding.

To understand a thing or event, each

individual must perceive it and make use of all the
knowledge "provided by logic, mathematics, the natural
sciences" and his or her understanding of the meanings
other individuals placed on the thing (Mises 1966, 49).
Thus, the meaning of any thing is open to change in the
mind of the individual as his or her knowledge and
experience affect his or her understanding.4
Even so basic a human physical characteristic as
speech, has ethical implications.5

As Ernest Barker

observes, the human "faculty of speech . . .

is not only

the basis of justice; it is an impulse towards good
fellowship and sociability"

(Barker 1959, 267).

Thus, the

entirety of human nature, including our capacities for
speech, for sociability, and ultimately for reasoning is
inseparably a part of our nature and, thus, our end,
happiness being the exercise of the best part of the human
being to the extent possible.

Indeed, while happiness

(in

its common use) can be found along a continuum between
brute pleasure on the low end and contemplation of the gods
on the high end, the animal pleasures in which we may
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indulge at the low end of the continuum are too far removed
from the ergon of the human being for them to constitute
the life of the individual in the polis.
With the foregoing in mind, the framework will
employ the following results-oriented definition of
communication:
Communicating in symbols and concepts is that mutually
purposeful, reflectively
open process that results in
understanding, consensus, appreciation, illumination,
resolution, and elevation.

Cooperative Inquiry
The philosophical view supporting the notion of
cooperative inquiry, especially in a structured "community
of

inquiry," is perhaps best set forth by Matthew

Lipman, a

modern pioneer in justifying philosophy as a core subject
in early education.®

Lipm a n 1s case for cooperative

inquiry, which he often refers to as a "community of
inquiry," is justified philosophically, and pursued, in a
context of philosophically oriented readings.

His

philosophical justification lies in the notion that
Socrates' admonition,

"Know thyself," was, in practice,

accomplished through "shared inquiry as a way of life."
Thus, in contrast to typical academic or theoretical
interchange, Lipman (1988, 14, 16-17) argues that the
"Socratic Method" should be:
the continued prosecution of philosophical inquiry by
following the reasoning wherever it leads (confident
that, wherever it leads, wisdom lies in that
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direction), not the heavy breathing and clanging of
armor in dialectical battles, where the premium is not
on insight but on victory.
(14)
Inquiry, following the Socratic way of life, is
"perseverance in self-corrective exploration of issues that
are felt to be both important and problematic (20)."

The

community of inquiry is a number of persons "committed to
self-corrective exploration and creativity," who together
form "a reflective community that thinks in the disciplines
about the world and about its thinking about the world,"
though thinking is always done by individuals (Lipman 1988,
20; Mises 1966, 177).

Moreover, in theory, a network of

interconnected and/or nested communities of inquiry, each
pursuing the problematic issues of importance to itself and
all holding "the same allegiance to the same procedures of
inquiry" will come to form ever more inclusive such
communities

(20).

Though speaking primarily to educators, and
frequently urging the study of philosophy as the means of
developing "reasonableness" as opposed to rationality,
Lipman gives a picture in the educational context of the
conduct of a community of inquiry.

Lipman urges:

converting the classroom into a community of inquiry,
where students and teachers can talk together as
persons and as members of the same community, where
they can read together, appropriate ideas together,
build on one another's ideas as well as think
independently, [become profoundly aware of how much
they can learn from other participants with whom they
strongly disagree].
(42)
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In such an environment, he maintains, participants wills
seek reasons for their views, explore their
presuppositions, so as to bring into their lives a
fresh sense of what it is to discover, to invent, to
interpret, and to criticize.
(42)
Ultimately, according to him, such:
A place [where the spoken dialogue among the members of
the class, when internalized and rendered an inner
forum in the mind of the participant, is the basis of
the process known as thinking.]
(11)
Fundamental to the Community of Inquiry is the
ability to self-correct, not only in the sense of
correction of error, but in the sense of correction of
partiality.

In this sense, the Community of Inquiry can be

perceived as a device to develop good moral character, the
ability to inquire and act cooperatively, and a strong
sense of mutually supportive community founded upon
cooperative inquiry and cooperative action.

As Lipman

describes the process:
To correct the partiality of what is gained by
observing from a single perspective, we must take into
account what is observed from other perspectives, and
still others.
The greater the number of perspectives,
the greater the comprehensiveness of information and
evidence, and the more we move in the direction of
impartiality.
Thus inquiry is necessarily
perspectival, social, and communal.7
(148)
Taking a system's view of a problem requires
cooperative inquiry.

David Bohm, as interpreted by Peter

M. Senge in The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of
the Learning Organization (1992), bases his work on the
theory and practice of dialogue on the quantum theory of
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physics, which:
implies that the universe is basically an indivisible
whole, even though on the larger scale it may be
represented approximately as divisible into separately
existing parts.
In particular, this means that at a
quantum theoretical level of accuracy, the observing
instrument and the observed object participate in each
other in an irreducible way. At this level perception
and action therefore cannot be separated.
(242-43)
T h u s , at the bottom of the notion of cooperative inquiry
are "two major intellectual currents":
the systems or holistic view of nature and the
interactions between our thinking and internal "models"
and our perceptions and actions.
(239)
Applying the electron sea as metaphor, Bohm asserts that:
we must look on thought as a systemic phenomena [sic]
arising from how we interact and discourse with one
another.
(240)
Bohm further refines our notion of effective
communication to distinguish between two primary types of
discourse: dialogue and discussion.

For Bohm, the

preferred type is "dialogue," that is,
meaning passing or moving through . . . a free flow of
meaning between people, in the sense of a stream that
flows between two banks.
(249)
The principal benefit of dialogue is that a community
"accesses a larger 'pool of common meaning,' which cannot
be accessed individually"

(240-41).

In dialogue, the

complex phenomena that are human affairs and human events
are explored by a community from many points of view.
Bohm,

For

"collective learning is not only possible but vital

to realize the potentials of human intelligence":
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Through dialogue people can help each other to become
aware of the incoherence in each ot h e r 's thoughts, and
in this way the collective thought becomes more and
more coherent. . . .
It is difficult to give a simple
definition of coherence, beyond saying that one may
sense in it as order, consistency, beauty, or harmony.8
(242-43)
There are three specific conditions that are
necessary for dialogue, according to Bohm:
1.

All participants must "suspend" their assumptions,
literally to hold them "as if suspended before us";

2.

All participants must regard one another as
colleagues;

3.

There must be a "facilitator" who "holds the
context" of dialogue.
(243)

Senge adds a fourth condition that provides that dialogue
and discussion must be balanced.

In Senge's view,

"discussion is the necessary counterpart of dialogue"
(247).

Senge distinguishes dialogue from discussion as

follows:
In dialogue, different views are presented as a means
toward discovering a new view.
In a discussion,
decisions are made.
In a dialogue, complex issues are
explored. . . . When they are productive, discussions
converge on a conclusion or course of action.
On the
other hand, dialogues are diverging; they do not seek
agreement, but a richer grasp of complex issues.
(247)
This notion of the community of inquiry, or
cooperative inquiry, can be seen to be fundamental to basic
concepts of the Austrian school of economics, probably the
foremost proponent of free markets and limited government
interference in economic and social affairs.

To my

knowledge, no such explicit "Austrian" case for cooperative
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inquiry has been made, though the case for cooperative
action is "of the essence" of the Austrian paradigm.

But,

in my view, a realistic view of human knowledge lends
itself as support for the crucial importance of cooperative
inquiry and the Austrian claims for free markets,
especially as advanced by Friedrich A. Hayek.
To Hayek, the central economic problem has to do
"not with the efficient utilization of scarce resources,
but rather with the generation and utilization of dispersed
knowledge"

(Gray 1984, 82-83).

At bottom, only a system

that permits genuinely cooperative inquiry and cooperative
action can avoid the Prisoner's Dilemma "in which agents
acting severally produce a situation which thwarts their
goals and harms their interests"

(121).

Within a community sharing such understanding, a
diversity of individual, group, and intergroup cultures is
to be encouraged.

But, as T. Alexander Smith proposes,

"congruence between the demands of temporality, diversity
of values, and institutional arrangements" must be achieved
for the community to remain stable or progress.

Smith

(1988) suggests that these demands can be:
most likely achieved (1) when social norms and values
are oriented more strongly to future ends than to
present gratification; (2) when free markets
predominate in economic life; and (3) when the "rule of
law" and clearly defined policy rules govern the
political community.
(9)
While the policy implications drawn from the essentially

Ill
human judgment process suggest a similar formula for public
policy, it is not the purpose of either the Essentially
Human Judgment Process or the Essential Interdependence
Paradigm to reach that result.

Rather, it is the sole

purpose of the process to encourage as much human
cooperation in the form of inquiry and action as is
reasonably

possible.

It is true that I believe that a

transition to a state similar to that espoused by Smith
above will tend to result as one takes into account, uses
and develops the human capacities of the persons affected
by a judgment, both in the judgment process and upon
implementation.

Thus, in my view— at a faster or slower

rate depending upon the individual, group and intergroup
cultures— if an Essentially Human Judgment Process is
undertaken, the policy implications will suggest and impose
themselves.
Finally, and in a related vein, Smith proposes that
individual, group, and intergroup cultures be analyzed in
terms of its ideological (meanings, values, norms),
behavioral, and material aspects (206) with particular
attention given to whether these three aspects are
"integrated, nonintegrated, or indeed quite contradictory
to one another."

From a policy point of view, it is

perhaps more helpful to think of this integration as
another situation where congruence should be tested.

Thus,

paraphrasing two of Smith's definitions, in the Essentially
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Human Judgment Process:
we are concerned with "cultural congruence," that is,
that any meanings, values and norms regarding purposive
actions under the judgment be objectified or
objectifiable in the overt behaviors and material
vehicles of individuals and groups.
(206, 207)
With these views in mind, this framework will
employ a definition of cooperative inquiry and action as
follows:
Cooperating in inquiry and action is concerted critical
and creative thinking; communicating in symbols and
concepts; and action aiming at the attainment of common
ends, together with an understanding of how to
complement one another's efforts, including, but not
limited to, cooperative action aiming at the free and
creative exploration of complex and subtle issues.

Role of the Facilitator in
the Community of Inquiry
As noted above, Bohm and Senge point to the
essential role of the facilitator to keep the cooperative
inquiry on track.

If we think of the teacher as being a

facilitator of the community rather than as an
"informational authority," Lipman (1988) provides for the
following role:
[T]he teacher must always take ultimate responsibility
for establishing those arrangements that will guide and
nudge the class into more and more productive, more and
more self-corrective discursive inquiry.
The teacher
must always be on alert for illogical conduct among the
students, just as a person chairing a meeting must be
alert to any possible transgression of the rules of
parliamentary procedure.
But even here the teacher
need not rule with a heavy hand.9 (97)
Significantly,

from the perspective of the Essentially
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Human Judgment Process, facilitation is an intervention
that encourages the employment of the Essential Human
Capacities of all those involved or affected.

Critical and Creative Thinking
Critical and creative thinking is purposefully, yet
paradoxically, the last developed of the Essential Human
Capacities.

It is the process that receives the most

attention in books on policy analysis or problem-solving,
yet it is highly dependent upon the other two capacities
for it to be effective.

Indeed, it is precisely because

the current processes focus upon thinking to the relative
ignoring of symbolic communication and cooperative inquiry,
they invariably become focused upon the thought process and
assume away problems of knowledge and understanding.

Most

processes that require the consideration of other points of
view and the challenging of assumptions, inferences, and
implications do not emphasize would constitute adequate
communication or encourage the forming of a community of
inquiry (but see Paul 1992; Lipman 1991).
Though thinking is always done by the individual,10
thinking that leads to judgment affecting others, that is
conducted without due regard for communication and
cooperative inquiry, cannot help being deficient in its
grasp of facts and understanding of human events.

In

short, in a world of uncertainty, one thinking in isolation
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cannot hope to understand the human events of the past or
present or their relevance to the future.
Critical and creative thinking is that purposeful,
intuitive, imaginative and self-regulatory process that
results in interpretative, analytical, evaluative,
inventive and constructive judgments, together with a
sound explanation of the evidential, conceptual,
understanding, systemic or methodological
considerations upon which they are based.
Of the essence of critical and creative thinking within a
judgment process is the need to reach a comprehensive
understanding of the human events involved and the points
of view of all those involved or affected by the judgment
process and the judgment (see, e.g., Paul 1992, 240-318).
Critical and creative thinking within an
essentially human judgment process is highly dependent upon
symbolic communication and is generally most effective when
employed within a community of cooperative inquiry.
Whether or not critical and creative thinking is performed
individually or in a group depends upon the time available
or the context within which the judgment is to be made, for
example, a leader may ultimately form the judgment after
individual reflection, or one placed in a difficult ethical
position may not be able to involve others in making a
judgment.

Regardless of the circumstances, critical and

creative thinking within the essentially human judgment
process is still employed.
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Bringing it All Together
There is a skill and knowledge component that
integrates critical and creative thinking and dialogue and
discussion.

The foregoing can be brought together if the

Essential Human Capacities are applied effectively and
efficiently in a systematic way.

Thus, for example,

provided an otherwise "essentially human" process is used
in ethical and policy study, a structured approach, such as
Michael Scriven's (1976) "Seven Steps in Argument Analysis"
integrates the employment of the Essential Human Capacities
(39-53).11
As Scriven argues:
Learning a new jargon or some technical calculus would
give you a sense of having learned something, but it
would not teach you something useful for . . . the
assessment and presentation of everyday arguments.
So
remember that the trick here is to do a familiar task
better, not to learn a new terminology for talking.
(39)
Having said this, however, it also true that, even the
prospects of doing a familiar task better, will be greatly
enhanced where the social aspects of critical and creative
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and
cooperating in inquiry and action are appreciated.
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Chapter Notes/5
•^Marine mammals and great apes may also communicate.
^Mortimer J. Adler (1985) asserts that there are
three dimensions of experience:
Perceptual objects that are really existing things
or events;
All other objects that may or may not exist, may
have existed in the past but no longer exist, or that
do not exist at present but may exist in the future;
and
The subjective experiences that exist only for the
individual mind that has them.
(29)
^Mises (1966) observes:
As a thinking and acting being man emerges from his
prehuman existence already as a social being.
The
evolution of reason, language, and cooperation is the
outcome of the same process; they were inseparably and
necessarily linked together.
But this process took
place in individuals.
(43)
^Things are ultimately
humans aim at. As such, the
individual
is a function of
on a thing
as a means to an

merely means toward ends which
meaning of a thing to an
the values derivatively placed
end.

5Aristotle wrote:
For nature . . . does nothing without a purpose; and
man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere
voice,
it is true, can indicate
pain and pleasure, and
therefore is possessed by other
animals as well .. .,
but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and
the harmful, and therefore also the right and the
wrong; for it is the special property of man in
distinction from the other animals that he alone has
perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the
other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these
things that makes a household and a city-state.
(Politics 1.1.1253al7-18)
6Lipman is only the "modern" proponent because, at
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least as early as Plato and Aristotle, the notion of
treating serious subjects for children through play, which
I read to mean, at bottom, their voluntary and guided, but
otherwise self-directed, efforts at understanding and
relating to the world around them as individuals and as a
community.
7For purposes of this treatise, this is considered to
be a search for shared vision, rather than for uniformity
or conformity.
8Whitehead (1938) declares that:
Morality is always aimed at that union of harmony,
intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection
of importance for that occasion.
(14)
^Lipman gives a number of examples of what would
defeat the "heavy hand":
He or she may ask the other students whether, for
example, a remark was, in their opinion, relevant;
whether an inference made did, in fact, follow
logically from the premises that had been established;
whether the most useful method of construing terms was
being utilized; or whether they agreed with the
assumptions that apparently underlay [sic] the
speaker's assertions.
(97)
lOThat is, there may be joint acting, but there is no
joint thinking (Mises 1966, 177-78).
ll-This raises the issue, beyond the scope of this
thesis, as to the proper balance between didactically
teaching about the structure of such an approach and
experiencing the community of inquiry.
It is a difficult
balance for the "facilitator" to reach since topic
development, process guidance, modeling, facilitation, and
even leadership are necessary for the successful community
of inquiry, yet each role tends to detract from what the
other roles have to add to the community.
See, e.g.,
Gardner (1995).

CHAPTER 6

ELEMENTS OF TIME AND CONCEPTS OF
QUALITY JUDGMENT AND ACTION

Time in General
In developing or employing the Essential Human
Capacities,

"time" remains an important, often critical,

factor both as to the time available to form a judgment
(see, e.g., T. Smith 1988; McIntyre 1990, 390), the time
periods applicable,^ and the time preferences of all those
involved or affected (Mises 1966, Chap. V).

Essential

elements in any Essentially Human Judgment Process are the
time available to acquire the needed knowledge, to employ
the process, to implement the judgment, to reconsider or
reevaluate the solution implemented, and to so habituate
the individuals in a community that the process becomes
custom (see, e.g., Burnyeat 1990, 69-92).2

Moreover, time

figures as a factor in reaching judgment in terms of the
time frame over which the judgment is to be implemented and
the value orientation of the individuals affected as to
t i m e .^
Though not a skill as such, the various aspects of
time must be understood and treated as factors integral to
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the employment of the Essential Human Capacities.

As T.

Alexander Smith (1988) declares:
We ignore the constraints which time places upon us at
our collective peril.
Human beings necessarily act
through time, so its mere passage has important
consequences for individuals and societies alike.
In
particular, our plans for the more or less distant
future are likely to go awry, since we perforce make
choices without prior knowledge and current information
about what others have done, are doing, and will do.
Our social worlds are accordingly uncertain and
unpredictable. (239)
Smith points out that time also has a function in
the uncertainty that surrounds us all:
Moreover, since each of us possesses a different stock
of knowledge accumulated through earlier experiences,
our imagined futures will likewise diverge.
Were any
two individuals to call somehow upon similar
experiences, it by no means follows that their
interpretations of the future would lead each to form
similar expectations about the course of subsequent
events.
We are thus doomed to live with uncertainty
and unpredictability.
(ibid.)
A related time function is the notion of time
preference and its impact upon human judgment.

All

purposeful action is made with reference to time
preference, i.e., any thing desired, ceteris paribus, is
preferred sooner rather than later.

As a result, the time

preferences of the persons affected by a judgment will
affect their valuation of the various ends sought, and
derivatively, the means to those ends (Mises 1966, 99-104,
483-90, 499-512).

The impact of time preference is so

significant that Smith declares that:
It follows that policies whose benefits are indirect,
and which occur in the long run, will receive far less
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support than those policies which are experienced in
the present, whose expected impacts are direct, and
which take place in the present.
(99)
There is, of course, more involved than time preference in
policies that emphasize the more immediate and the more
direct impacts.

The very nature of politics, especially in

a democracy, may well reflect more the intensity of the
interests involved in the public policy-making process,
themselves a function of time preference and self-interest,
than a short-term time preference in the process as a
whole.

Our challenge is to develop a framework that

overcomes myopia, parochialism, and impulsiveness.

Time and the Essential Interdependence Paradigm
The Essential Interdependence Paradigm has seven
time considerations at three distinct points therein:
1.

The amount of time available to the judgment
formulators;

2.

The time frame(s) within which the judgment is to
be effective, i.e., short-term, medium-term, and
long-term;

3.

The value orientation forming the basis of the
judgment: past, present, or future;

4.

The amount of time available to use Quality
Judgment during the implementation phase;

5.

The amount of time available to implement the
Judgment;

6.

The time available to reflect upon, and learn from,
the action, and

7.

The period of time over which an individual and/or
community exercises the Essential Human Capacities
so as to habituate the individual and/or community
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so that it becomes a custom.

Quality Judgment and Quality Action
For purposes of this process, and by definition,
Quality Judgment is that which results from employing the
above process, which includes (but is not limited to)
choices, decisions, plans, policies, and visions
Yankelovich 1991, 24, 38).

(see also

A more precise description of

Quality Judgment, as a product, might be as follows;
Quality Judgment results when one (as far as is reasonably
possible) has acquired comprehensive understanding of a
matter; is able to make a clear statement of the conditions
that must be met for success; accepts responsibility for
the judgment; and remains open to reevaluating it.
For purposes of this process, and by definition,
Quality Action results when implementing a Quality Judgment
with sufficient time and latitude that the agents
implementing the judgment, and all those affected thereby,
are able to employ (as far as is reasonably possible) their
Essential Human Capacities in cooperative action.

A more

precise definition of Quality Action might be as follows;
Quality Action results when one (as far as is reasonably
possible) acts upon a Quality Judgment with comprehensive
understanding of its impact on all those affected thereby;
is able to form appropriate Quality Judgments in order to
implement the original judgment; engages in cooperative
action with those persons affected by the action; and
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accepts responsibility for his or her part therein.

Quality Judgment
A Quality Judgment may be any one of two general
types: path-finding and problem-solving.
to answer different questions.
What is the good life?
future?

Each is designed

Path-finding questions are:

What visions do I have for the

What expectations can I have for the possibilities

of future action?
mission?

What is the problem?

What is my

Problem-solving questions are more common: What

can I do to make the hurt go away?

What can I do to bring

my reality closer to my vision?
Quality Judgment is not static; it is the result of
a continuous process of employing the Essential Human
Capacities in cooperative inquiry, preferably in a
community or communities of inquiry.

An agent making a

Quality Judgment must be willing and able to adjust the
judgment to new understandings or events and know when an
adjustment strays too far from the community's
understanding of the complex issues upon which the judgment
was based.

Quality Action
Quality Judgment is as static as necessary for
action to be taken, but as dynamic as necessary for the
action taken to be cooperative rather than merely commanded
or coordinated.4

Thus, Quality Action results when
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sufficient time and latitude are afforded the implementors
such that they are able to make those Quality Judgments
necessary to "flesh out" the original Quality Judgment.
Quality Action is to be distinguished from
commanded action or coordinated action.

For purposes of

this thesis, commanded action is directive in nature; it
may require little or no critical and creative thinking;
communicating in symbols and concepts; or cooperating in
inquiry or action.

Coordinated action is also directive in

nature as people are told what to do, but it typically
requires some critical and creative thinking within the
rules pronounced and some communication and joint action
between people is possible.

Quality Action (as far as is

reasonably possible) is cooperative action, that is, it is
not directed, it has strong informal elements and requires
a high degree of critical and creative thinking;
communicating in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in
inquiry and action.

Thus, for Quality Action, each agent

must cooperatively implement that part of a judgment for
which he or she is responsible while adjusting to reality
as he or she sees it, which includes how one's colleagues
are adjusting to the environment as they see it.
At first glance, this definition of Quality Action
may seem to preclude the autonomous action of the
craftsman, innovator, or "rugged individual."

On

reflection, however, Quality Action can be seen to include
the truly autonomous agent.

First, in the narrower sense,
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the definition is qualified by the condition "as far as is
reasonably possible."

Thus, certain "quality" actions may

have to be performed in isolation.

But, in the broader

sense, no action that is in any practical sense "quality"
is done in isolation.

Whether it is the identification of

the thing or service to produce or provide, the procuring
of the raw materials, the sustenance required throughout
the process, or the distribution of the product or
provision of the service, the Essential Human Capacities
must be employed for the agent's limited time and effort to
be productive.
It may happen that an agent will expend time and
effort in isolation and without employing the Essential
Human Capacities and create, or do, something of value.
But, this should not be seen to be an essentially human
act.

Thus, where assembly-line workers or riflemen in the

attack have been deprived of the autonomy to employ their
Essential Human Capacities or act cooperatively, their acts
(though they may be of great social value) are not, at that
time and in that place, essentially human unless it is
reasonable under the circumstances to defer to the will of
another.

"As Far As Is Reasonably Possible"
A key qualifying clause in the definitions of the
Essential Human Judgment Process, Quality Judgment, and
Quality Action is "As Far As Is Reasonably Possible."

This
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clause basically transforms these concepts into
presumptions.

The effect is to treat them as standards

against which decision-making, policy making, and policy
implementation are measured, subject always to a reasoned,
communicable argument as to why the standards should not be
applied in a particular instance.
For example, let us return to our example of the
sinking ship.

The crew is standing by lifeboats, people

are climbing into the boats preparing to abandon ship.

You

are running toward the last of the lifeboats when you
notice two people standing on opposite sides of the ship.
One is the Captain, who is calmly watching the ship take on
water, giving every indication that he intends to go down
with the ship.

The other is a person who has quite clearly

panicked and is frozen with fear.
Here, the lack of time, the gravity of the
situation, and panic involved would together constitute a
good argument against meeting the formal requirements of an
Essentially Human Judgment Process, Quality Judgment, and
Quality Action as to the person overcome by panic.

We

previously concluded that intervention in the form of
actually coercing the person into the lifeboat would be
reasonable.

The judgment and action themselves would be

"quality" under these circumstances because that was all
that was reasonable under the circumstances.
The Captain's situation, however, is dramatically
different.

Here, he is apparently in full control of his
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capacities and has apparently made a decision in full
accordance with the customs and traditions of his
profession.

While these customs and traditions may make

little sense to us, they embody knowledge dating from
ancient times, presumably reflecting some values that have
withstood the test of time.

Provided the Captain is

apparently able to exercise his Essential Human Capacities,
both you and he have met the formal requirements of the
concepts.

It would violate those requirements to disregard

his will and force him into the lifeboat.
The same analysis holds for public policy issues.
A number of factors, individually or collectively, might
militate against fully employing the Essential Human
Capacities of any or all those involved or affected:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

The gravity of the situation;
The lack of time available;
Separation in time, such as intergenerational
issues;
Separation in space, such as distance or national
or natural boundaries;
Any deficiencies in the Essential Human Capacities,
including their poor state of development or
maintenance, or their impairment, whether through
passion, greed, etc.;
Any conflict in visions or values; and
Any conflict in views of reality or expectations.
Whatever the factor or factors involved that are

deemed to constitute a reasonable argument against meeting
the formal requirements for employing the essential Human
Capacities, there is almost never justification for not
taking into account the impact of the judgment on the
capacities of all those affected.
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For example, a political decision may be made by
representatives of the citizenry with their minimal
involvement in the decision itself.

It may be the case

that a portion of the citizenry participates by lobbying
the politicians and bureaucrats involved in making policy,
but the matter is considered too subject-sensitive or too
time-sensitive to permit further public involvement.

To

the extent that this process reflects the shared vision and
values of the citizenry, it may be said to have complied
with the formal requirements of the Essential Human
Judgment Process and a Quality Judgment.

But, it will

remain the case that the impact of the judgment on those
affected, over time, may be such that their Essential Human
Capacities are neither developed nor maintained, at least
insofar as public judgment is concerned.

The impact will

be particularly detrimental to the development and
maintenance of the Essential Human Capacities of the
citizenry if the judgment is a law not in concert with the
shared visions or values of the citizenry.

Quality Judgment and Quality Action over Time
A significant consequence of employing an
Essentially Human Judgment Process and engaging in Quality
Action over time is the habituation of the individual and
the development of custom among a community.

Through the

exercise of critical and creative thinking and
communication skills— over time and in supportive
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communities of cooperative inquiry— individuals will
develop the self-confidence, the self-discipline, the
maturity, the empathy and the courage to see an ethical or
policy issue; engage in the thinking and communication
required to reach Quality Judgment; and act in accordance
with that judgment.

Thus, Quality Judgment and Quality

Action over time are of the greatest significance for the
individual and the community.
In sum, humans— through exercising an Essentially
Human Judgment Process to reach Quality Judgment and
Quality Action— grow, develop, and reinforce all that which
is essentially human in themselves and their community.

It

follows from this that, from the perspective of the members
of a community, any process that does not involve the
reasonable participation of all persons affected by a
decision (whether directly or indirectly) employs less
human capacity than is available, cannot be Quality
Judgment, and may actually lead to disharmony in a
community.

Moreover, the essentially human involvement of

the persons affected by a judgment, both in the process and
the policy, results in Quality Action, which tends to
generate the necessary community support or consensus
essential to maintenance of a policy over time and is of
the essence of democracy.
Thus, the optimal outcome for an essentially human
judgment process for the community is two-fold.

First,

Quality Judgment is arrived at as informally as possible
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through the reasonable participation of all individuals
affected, directly and indirectly, through critical and
creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts;
and cooperating in inquiry and action.

Second, the

original Quality Judgment is implemented through Quality
Action with autonomous agents employing the Essential Human
Capacities.
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Chapter Notes/6
1Indeed, T. Alexander Smith (1989) has observed that:
Most policy disputes over the proper role of government
in the economy are in reality disagreements over the
long run or the short run.
(97)
^See also Yankelovich (1991) as to the time necessary
to permit the persons involved in the judgment process or
affected by a judgment to "absorb and accept all the
consequences of their own views" (118).
3A s to the latter notion, see Spiegel (1974, 38-39);
see also, Hofstede (1991, Chap. 7).
4Thus, there is a distinction drawn between "rules"
and "commands" or "policy rules." Rules, which may or may
not be personally and voluntarily agreed to, tell all
members of the community what they cannot do, not what they
must do.
Commands or "policy rules" tend to "allocate
resources of various kinds among selected groups" and
therefore tell certain persons what they must do."

PART III

IMPLICATIONS, GUIDELINES & APPLICATION

CHAPTER 7

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES
Policy Implications of the Judgment Process
When a new human being is born, the process of its
creation has only just begun.

Indeed, the most significant

part of the process may be the two or four years
immediately ahead as the human child develops her
consciousness of the world around her and her other
essential human capacities so that she may consciously
participate in it.
The implications of the assumptions underlying the
Essential Interdependence Paradigm, as well the framework
itself, have enormous policy implications.

It can readily

be seen that it would be irresponsible for parents to bear
children where they are unable or unwilling to devote the
time, energy and attention required to provide for the
existence and energy of the child at a minimum, and, more
importantly, to develop fully her essential human
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capacities.
The implications of this approach for the debates
over the significance of the sexual revolution and a return
to "traditional values," the propriety of contraception and
abortion, child custody, welfare reform, education,
humanitarian assistance, and foreign aid to developing
nations are many, varied, and significant.
For example, any significant devotion of time,
energy and attention to

sexual activity for the sake

of

pleasure that is not a part of an activity that is
otherwise "essentially human" must be seen to be neither
"essentially good" nor "responsible," since the Essential
Human Capacities have not been employed and the activity
itself does not lead to their development and maintenance.
Moreover, even sexual activity that develops, maintains,
and employs these capacities for one partner is not good to
the degree that it does
If there is any

not do so for the other.
substantial potential that a life

may be generated, and the partners know that they are
neither willing nor able to nurture the child for those
essential formative years, the sexual activity is not
essentially responsible unless reasonably adequate
contraception is used.

Since contraception is not fool

proof at present, only knowing that abortion is an option
would eliminate the probability that a fetus created would,
with the passage of time, develop the Essential Human
Capacities.
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Where good sexual activity results in a potential
life having an existence in utero, and a part in the
evolutionary process, it would be presumptively unethical
to terminate its existence unless there was no
opportunity— throughout the entire society— for the child 1s
existence and energy to be maintained and her Essential
Human Capacities developed, maintained and employed.

This

framework implies that to the extent a society subsidizes
the abortion of the fetus, without encouraging the adoption
of the child it would probably have become by willing and
capable persons, it is neither compassionate nor caring in
any essentially human sense.
To the extent that parental involvement is required
for the Essential Human Capacities of the child to be
developed and maintained, it is irresponsible for the
parents to pursue their life projects to the detriment of
the development of the child's capacities.

The child,

after all, has but one chance to develop those capacities
fully and well.

To the extent that it does not value the

child rearing role of its citizens, workers, and colleagues
(traditionally women), it is not essentially good, true, or
beautiful.

To the extent that a society discourages this

devotion of time, energy, and attention, it is not an
essentially true, good, or beautiful society.
The same logic applies where a society essentially
subsidizes the birth of children without regard to whether
their Essential Human Capacities can or will be developed.
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So, where a society subsidizes having children or mandates
parental leave or day care that cannot substitute for the
close and personal involvement of the parents, its policies
are not essentially human and the society cannot be
essentially good, true, or beautiful.

It may espouse the

importance of children; it may even love its children
passionately.

It may be powerful, cultured, and refined,

but it is not essentially good, true, or beautiful.
Conversely, where an individual or couple has put
in the energy, time, and attention to develop the Essential
Human Capacities, they may be thought to be the "essential
parents" of the child, having more claim to parenthood than
those who merely conceived and bore the child.

Where

adopted children are routinely returned to biological
parents, the society honors the biological parents over the
essential parents.

In so doing, it dishonors the essential

humanity of the adoptive parents and the child as well.
To the extent that a society's notions of goodness,
truth, and beauty are commanded or manipulated by a
government— against the custom and traditions of its people
and without their active involvement— that society is not
essentially good, essentially true, or essentially
beautiful.

To the extent that the society glorifies

coercion and violence over development, maintenance, and
employment of the Essential Human Capacities, over
expanding consciousness, choosing and acting, and dealing
properly with the objects of our compassion, it cannot
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become an essentially good, essentially true, or
essentially beautiful society.
Finally, to the extent that its system of
education, whether public or private, develops a citizenry
that learns through didactic teaching methods that
encourage data dumps followed by regurgitation of the data
dumped, the society is not essentially good, essentially
true, or essentially beautiful.

Didactically teaching even

the truest of skills and knowledge, the best of values, the
most exquisite of beauty cannot make it an essentially
true, essentially good, or essentially beautiful society.
A few principles, moreover, are implicit in the
Essential Interdependence Paradigm:
A.

While it is not essential that every person in a

community participate in an essentially human judgment
process to reach Quality Judgment, it is essential to
realize that to the extent members of a community are
excluded from participation, or are unable to participate,
the outcome of the process is, to that extent, less than
optimal.
B.

Coercion and compulsion, from whatever source

(whether from government interference or the violence of
private individuals) and for whatever reason (however wellintentioned), should be seen as distorting the capacity of
the individual to fully exercise his or her human
capacities.

This adversely affects both the perpetrator

and the victim.
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C.

In order not to endanger the working of social

cooperation, the individual must abstain from satisfying
those desires whose satisfaction would hinder the
establishment of societal institutions that permit or
encourage cooperative inquiry and action.
D.

All progress within any community is the direct

result of the continuous development and expansion of its
m e m b e r s ' capacities for cooperative inquiry and cooperative
action.
E.

For any community that is structured or operated in

such a fashion that judgments affecting the members of that
community are made without the participation of the members
affected, the outcome of a process is to that extent less
than optimal.
F.

Policy makers must take into account the "creative

aspect or dimension" involved in implementing a judgment in
an inherently uncertain environment and provide that
whoever implements a judgment must have both the time and
flexibility necessary to modify, adapt, or terminate the
judgment as experience suggests.
G.

In a community, based upon the division of labor

and social cooperation, and composed of autonomous
individuals, solidarity requires clear understanding of the
community vision, core values, and principles underlying
the policy and the rules implementing them.
H.

Individuals who wish to create the lives they truly

desire to live must seek to connect with others in a
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community that supports, even applauds, such activity.
I.

There can be no ethics or policy experts whose harm

will not exceed his or her value to a human community to
the extent that that expertise is not grounded on, and
within, an essentially human judgment process.

Methodological Guidelines
Definitions
Though the Essential Interdependence Paradigm is a
priori and conceptual in its origins and presentation, a
certain degree of objectivity is possible.

This measure of

objectivity is possible not only by considering the amount
of personal participation in making a judgment, but, the
kinds and degrees of interpersonal relationships and the
extent to which persons, in each relationship, are
employing their Essentially Human Capacities to create the
lives they truly desire to live.

These methodological

guidelines should be seen as representative, rather than
comprehensive.
They do, however, suggest opportunities for further
research.

For example, to the extent that critical and

creative thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts;
and cooperating in inquiry and action can be objectively
measured, such measurements can be applied to determining
their correlation to arriving at Essential Human Truth.
One might, for example, explore the correlation between
effectiveness, efficiency, and safety and the development,
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maintenance, and employment of the Essential Human
Capacities in companies that consciously recruit, train,
educate, and develop its employees with these capacities in
mind.
Relationships can be characterized as varying along
two principal dimensions, the formal/informal dimension
(the kind of relationship) and the personal/impersonal
dimension (the degree of relationship).

Formal

relationships are those that are "well-defined, limited, in
ways that are publicly understood and publicly sanctioned"
(Card 1990, 210). 1

Having such a relationship "facilitates

control where there would otherwise be a lack of trust or
simply an inability to predict and plan."

A "personal"

relationship is "when it matters to the parties who the
other parties are and when this mattering is important to
the nature of the relationship."

Characteristics of

personal relationships are closeness and intimacy and raise
issues of attachment and antipathy.2

Informal

relationships are not necessarily personal, though they are
"characterized by responsibilities that can facilitate
relationships of attachment."

Being able to estimate the

formal/informal personal/impersonal dimensions is important
because formality and impersonality tend to inhibit genuine
communication between participants, one positively
antithetical to the notion of community of inquiry, and to
that degree tends to forestall critical and creative
thinking particularly in persons occupying the lower rungs
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of a hierarchical organization.

Toward the "Essentially Human"
As human affairs are too complex and subjective for
the following standards to be precisely measured, the
following guidelines should not be used for any purpose
other than as a guide to, or as a presumptive basis for
estimating, the kind and degree of interpersonal
relationships in a community; the kind and degree of social
cooperation; and the kind and degree of essentially human
activities pursued.
To estimate the degree to which a community, its
judgment processes, and its policies approach the ideal of
being essentially human the following steps should be
taken:

first, determine the kind and degree of individual

participation for the pathfinding, problem-solving and
implementing required; second, determine the quality of
individual participation in terms of the Essential Human
Capacities; third, determine the kind and degree of
interpersonal relationships established and maintained;
fourth, apply certain presumptive preferences

(ceteris

paribus) as to the kind of participation and interpersonal
relationships; fifth, apply certain presumptive preferences
(ceteris paribus) as to the degree of participation and
interpersonal relationships; sixth, determine the attention
given to matters of time, time value orientation, time
frames, and time preferences; and seventh, determine the
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presence or absence of the conditions for Quality Action
and creativity.
A.

As to the degree and kind of individual

participation and relationships established and maintained:
Ml
Arithmetically, determine the number of
persons involved in or affected by the judgment who (a)
did not (or were unable) to participate fully in the
process of arriving at the judgment,3 both path-finding
and problem-solving, (b) did not have their point of
view considered fully
in the process of arriving at the
judgment, or (c) will
not be involved fully in the
implementation of the
action program.
M2
Any increase in participation by the involved
or affected population in pathfinding, or making,
implementing, or evaluating a judgment (or its program)
is better than no such increase, a lesser increase or a
decrease.
M3
Any increase in critical and creative
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and/or
cooperating in inquiry or action in pathfinding or
making, implementing, or evaluating of a judgment (or
its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser
increase, or a decrease.
B.

In comparing the projected outcomes

(assuming no

coercion or fraud), the following presumptive preferences,
ceteris paribus, apply as to the kind of relationships:4
M4
Arithmetically and geometrically, compare the
number and kind of relationships by category:
(a)
formal and impersonal, (b) formal and personal, (c)
informal and impersonal; and (d) informal and personal.
M5
A greater number of informal relationships is
better than a greater number of formal relationships.
M6
A greater number of informal relationships in
either degree is better than fewer such relationships.
M7
Fewer new formal relationships are better
than more such relationships.
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M8
Any change in a formal relationship to an
informal relationship is better than the status quo or
the change of an informal relationship to a formal one.
C.

In comparing the projected outcomes, and assuming

no coercion or fraud, the following presumptive preference,
ceteris paribus, applies as to the degree of relationships:
M9
A greater number of informal and personal
relationships is better than a greater number of
informal and impersonal relationships.
D.

As to the quality of participation and action

within interpersonal relationships:
M10
Congruence within individuals and within the
groups and intergroup between the demands of
temporality, diversity of values, and institutional
arrangements must be achieved,6 that is, that any
meanings, values and norms regarding purposive actions
under the judgment be objectified or objectifiable in
the overt behaviors and material vehicles6 of
individuals and groups.
E.

As to time, time frames, and time preferences:

Mil
judgment?

Was adequate time available to make the

Ml2
Did the judgment process give as much
consideration to alternatives that take effect later
rather than sooner, whose expected impacts are
indirect, and whose benefits occur in the long run?
Ml3
Did the judgment take into account the time
value orientation of all persons involved in making the
judgment and affected by the judgment?
M14
Was adequate time available to use Quality
Judgment during the implementation phase?
Ml5
Will the individual and/or community
exercise critical and creative thinking; communicating
in symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and
action skills over such a period that they will become
habit for the individual or custom for the community?

142
F.

As to the possibility of Essential Human Excellence

(optimal experience):
Ml6
To what degree were all those involved or
affected engaged in meaningful activity?
Ml7
To what degree did all those involved know
what must be done?
M18
To what degree are the challenges wellmatched by abilities of all those involved or affected
to employ we 11-developed Essential Human Capacities;
Ml9
To what degree were all those involved or
affected able to balance their challenges against their
Essential Human Capacities?
M20
To what degree were all those involved or
affected given the opportunity for concentration and
involvement ?
M21
To what degree were all those involved or
affected given sufficient feedback to permit a clear
vision, an accurate, insightful view of current
reality, and reasonable expectations of the
possibilities of future action?
M22
To what degree did all persons involved or
affected experience a sense that influencing the
creative process is possible in principle?
G.

As to the possibility of creativity:

M23
To what degree are the persons involved or
affected motivated by the belief that, through his or
her individual efforts, the world can be changed?
M24
To what degree do the persons involved or
affected have well-developed Essential Human
Capacities, a discovery orientation, and intrinsic
motivation?7
M25 To what degree are the persons involved or
affected a part of a creative system: Is the main
concern of the community to preserve or change the
community?
How many variations are the community
equipped to recognize? What are its resources for
controlling the rate of individual variations? What
are its selection criteria concerning new variations?
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What is the status of community relative to other
communities in the social system?
Is the community
autonomous, made up of persons controlling their own
destiny, or is it controlled by external institutions?^
To what extent is human creativity stifled by the
control of the community?

Conclusion and Preview
Having detailed a psychological and philosophical
basis for an Essentially Human Judgment Process, laid out
the assumptions underlying an Essential Interdependence
Paradigm, defined and discussed the most important concepts
included in the framework, described the policy
implications of the framework, and developed a number of
methodological guidelines to aid in further inquiry, we are
now ready to apply the Essentially Human Judgment Process
to a fact situation, the current dilemma over what policy
to apply for single-parent welfare.
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Chapter Notes/7
1Institutions are formal; rights are characteristic
of very formal relationships (Card 1990, 210-11).
^Spousehood is a formally defined status in law which
nonetheless is characterized by informal and personal
obligations.
So, the relationship is one of mixed formal
and informal and personal obligations.
The relationship of teacher to student under a didactic
model is primarily formal and impersonal as the teacher has
informational authority.
The same relationship under a
community of inquiry model is formal in the sense that the
teacher has instructional authority, but informal and
personal in the conduct of the community of inquiry itself.
The relationship of a doctor to a patient is often
considered informal and personal, but it becomes more
formal as the patient asserts rights, though it retains
aspects of the personal.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is
largely informal and personal, though like marriage, it is
formal to the extent it is regulated by the state.
The
relationship of judge to a defendant, on the other hand, is
both formal and impersonal.
P a r t i c i p a t i o n of members of the affected population
should be considered to the degree that each is "informed
and competent," that is, more weight should be given to
those adept in the Essential Human Skills.
Accordingly, some participants’ opinions will be
Quality Judgments accorded great weight.
Other
participants' opinions will be considered "Mere Opinion"
and given little weight beyond consideration of the fact
that those indeed were the opinions (possibly only illconsidered desires) of those participants at the time and
in that place.
Time is a factor here because, as members of a
community are more-or-less informed and/or competent, it
will be reasonable often to make more time available to
those capable of making Quality Judgments rather than to
those capable of only mere opinion.
Note that "informed and competent" in this context does
not preclude the expert and his or her expertise, but it is
unlikely that expertise alone, as presently offered and
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used, will rise to being Quality Judgment.
The principal
shortcoming will be that one having such specialized
knowledge will be less inclined to consider (as far as
reasonably possible) the points of view of those of the
affected population and will have concentrated on acquiring
some knowledge to the exclusion of all other (see, e.g.,
Saul 1992; Formaini 1990; McCollough 1991, 3, 5, 61, 82-4).
4A s all progress within any community is the direct
result of the continuous development and expansion of its
m e m b e r s 1 capacities for cooperative inquiry and cooperative
action, it is possible to establish normative standards to
guide policy formulation and evaluation.
5Called "cultural congruence"

(T. Smith 1988, 206,

207).
®For example, the stated norm or value of "empowering
employees" would not be integrated with behaviors and
material vehicles, if management did not behave as though
employees actually had power or provide them with the
material vehicles, e.g., access, tools, computers,
communications equipment, communities of cooperative
inquiry, etc. for employees to actually act autonomously,
cooperatively, and constructively.
7Csikszentmihalyi discusses the relationship between
personality traits and values, cognitive orientation toward
discovery, and intrinsic motivation in "The Domain of
Creativity," Chap. in Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and
Gardner 1994.

(1994,

^Compare Feldman, Csikszentmihalyi, and Gardner
152) with Jackall (1983, 118-30).

CHAPTER 8

APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION

Application of the Framework and
Methodological Guidelines
By way of example, let us turn to a simple fact
situation that illustrates the much larger social problem
of "the impoverished single-parent."

Using the Essential

Interdependence Paradigm, especially its Essentially Human
Judgment Process, I will evaluate the effects of a decision
to institute a program similar to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children.
This situation is chosen because of its currency
and its importance to our society.

Charles Murray, in a

1993 article in the Wall Street Journal, developed the
significance of this problem.

He observed that, in 1991,

1.2 million children were born to unmarried mothers, nearly
30 percent of all births.

Murray noted that this

percentage is four percentage points higher than the black
illegitimacy rate in the early 1960s that prompted national
concern.

With the national percentage at 30 percent and

the overall white illegitimacy rate at 22 percent, Murray
concludes that not only had the public policy problem of
146
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providing support to the unwed single mother become a
bigger problem, but that it was spreading to the dominant
white middle class from the marginalized black underclass.
Murray (1993) argues that:
My proposition is that illegitimacy is the single most
important social problem of our time— more important
than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or
homelessness because it drives everything else.
Doing
something about it is not just one more item on the
American policy agenda, but should be on top.
(A14)
We will take as given that the single parent in our
case should not, as a matter of public policy, receive from
all sources, including the government, less than $10,000.00
per year in order to adequately care for her child or
children.

Each guideline will be set forth followed by

discussion of its application to the problem presented.
Ml
Arithmetically, determine the number of persons
involved in or affected by the judgment who (a) did not
(or were unable) to participate fully in the process of
arriving at the judgment,1 both path-finding and
problem-solving, (b) did not have their point of view
considered fully in the process of arriving at the
judgment, or (c) will not be involved fully in the
implementation of the action program.
Discussion:

Pre-program, the typical single-parent is a

woman, usually under-educated, and if employed, unable to
make $10,000 per year.

She uses modestly well-developed

critical and creative thinking skills, communication skills
and cooperation skills in eking out an existence for
herself and her child.

She deals with an employer who is

unable or unwilling to pay her $10,000.00 per year.

She

periodically has to approach charitable organizations or
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her church and plead her case for why she should receive
assistance.

She occasionally turns to her parents or

siblings for assistance who insist upon some accounting for
the use of the funds.

She occasionally gets support from

the father of the child or children.
support from a lover or friends.

She occasionally gets

In the end, however, she

does not receive the needed $10,000.00 per year.
When the judgment process is followed to initiate
the AFDC Program, none of the people described above are
involved in the decision, except to the extent they had
voted for their members of Congress.

Their individual and

community visions of what is a good life are not
considered, except very indirectly, and their individual
and community values, other than survival, are not
considered, except through representation.

Even this

representation may not truly reflect the people involved or
affected by the program, since it may have been authorized
through manipulation in the political process, political
advertising, speeches, and literature.

There is no

opportunity for innovation on the part of most of the
participants, whether the bureaucrats or the recipients.
After the program is initiated, none of the people
mentioned above participates in making the decision about
whether or not she should receive assistance, to what ends,
how much, for how long, or under what other conditions.
Finally, none of the persons mentioned above are involved
in implementing the program as a new bureaucracy has been
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established, with a full set of implementing rules, which
do not require critical and creative thinking;
communicating in symbols and concepts; or cooperating in
inquiry and action.

Indeed, it is illegal for her to

violate restrictions on receiving support from others so
long as she receives program funds.
For our single parent to apply, she needs to
communicate only in terms of description, that is she
merely describes her status.

There may be some

communicating in symbols and concepts, but, for the most
part, she needs only to describe her situation.

Moreover,

the bureaucrat's work is not characterized by use the
Essential Human Capacities to make a decision.

His or her

discretion is limited essentially to matching the
applicant's description to the requirements of the rules,
though there is some evaluation as to the credibility of
her description.
M2
Any increase in participation by the involved or
affected population in path-finding, or making,
implementing, or evaluating a judgment (or its program)
is better than no such increase, a lesser increase or a
decrease.
Discussion:

We see from the description in Ml that there

is significantly less "essentially human" activity after
the program.

To the extent that the single-parent receives

the $10,000.00 from the government, she no longer deals
with her employer; she no longer has to plead her case at a
charity; she no longer has to appeal to her family; and she
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is less dependent upon the father of the children.
Moreover, she is able to have additional children through
other lovers and receive more money through merely
describing the fact that she now has one additional child.
Moreover, assuming that the bureaucrat had used his or her
Essential Human Capacities before landing his or her AFDC
job, that person is now acting in far less of an
"Essentially Human" capacity.
Under the M2 guideline, the situation is
significantly less "essentially human."
are more severe, however.

The consequences

The charity's role, which has

now been largely supplanted by the government, had formerly
made appeals to other persons for funds.

Since these

appeals were voluntary, they used their Essential Human
Capacities to describe the social problem, show how that
charity could help, and argue why it would be in the
interests of contributors to assist.

It is true that this

frequently was persuasion rather than a community of
inquiry, however, none of these capacities are required now
to be used for this purpose.

The government program does

not need persuasion to accumulate the funds.

By the same

token, the contributors, who used to use the Essential
Human Capacities to decide whether the problem was as the
charity described and whether they should contribute their
own assets to that charity toward solving that problem, now
either no longer use the Essential Human Capacities or use
them to avoid paying the taxes used for the AFDC Program.

151
Further, the impact on the child is problematical.
If one follows George Herbert Mead and Jurgen Habermas as
to the social aspect of development of consciousness, it
may be that the child has been deprived of exposure to
well-developed and employed Essential Human Capacities,
unless the program provides for such exposure.

This may be

why the 25 percent threshold of illegitimacy among the
white majority, which Charles Murray pointed to, is so
significant.

It may be that that high a percentage

portends a community that makes such exposure for its
children problematic.
M3
Any increase in critical and creative thinking;
communicating in symbols and concepts; and/or
cooperating in inquiry or action in pathfinding or
making, implementing, or evaluating of a judgment (or
its program) is better than no such increase, a lesser
increase, or a decrease.
Discussion:

Under this guideline, though the goal

assisting the children may be admirable, the program as
described is not "essentially human."
M4
Arithmetically and geometrically, compare the
number and kind of relationships by category:
(a)
formal and impersonal, (b) informal and impersonal; and
(c) informal and personal.
Discussion:

We may summarize here by noting that, though

the relationships that existed pre-program did not generate
the $10,000.00, they were largely informal and usually
personal.

Post-program the relationships that generated

the funds, both from the point of view of the government
vis a vis the taxpayer and the single-parent vis a vis the
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government are formal and impersonal.
M5 A greater number of informal relationships is
better than a greater number of formal relationships
Discussion:

The program fails this guideline.

M6 A greater number of informal relationships in
either degree is better than fewer such relationships.
Discussion:

The program fails this guideline.

M7
Fewer new formal relationships are better than more
such relationships.
Discussion:

The Program fails this guideline.

M8 Any change in a formal relationship to an informal
relationship is better than the status quo or the
change of an informal relationship to a formal one.
Discussion:

The program fails this guideline.

M9 A greater number of informal and personal
relationships is better than a greater number of
informal and impersonal relationships.
Discussion:

The program fails this guideline.

Of the remaining guidelines, it is enough if we
discuss them together, with emphasis on guideline, M15.
Ml5
Will the individual and/or community exercise
critical and creative thinking; communicating in
symbols and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and
action skills over such a period that they will become
habit for the individual or custom for the community?
Discussion:

Here, suffice it to say, if Aristotle is

right— that a person becomes what his or her habits are,
and a community becomes what the customs and traditions of
its members are— then the AFDC program should not bode well
for a community having a large portion of its members
dependent upon it.

As to the transfer of the $10,000.00
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itself, significantly less employment of the Essential
Human Capacities is in evidence, from a purely objective
point of view, in the affected community.

As the single

parent is transformed from an employee, and even as a
supplicant, to a case file, she uses significantly fewer of
her Essential Human Capacities than she would have before.
The employer, family, friends and lovers are no longer
involved.

The charity that could every day redefine its

vision of the community it desired to serve was replaced by
laws and rules and constituencies of service providers
changeable only thorough the political process.

The

contributors were replaced by taxpayers.
The system is essentially rules-following and
bureaucratic, hence, it has little room for creativity or a
sense of the possibility of control.

Indeed, the very

nature of the system, one of entitlement, however wellintentioned, does not tap the intrinsic motivation and use
of the Essential Human Capacities that the Essential
Interdependence Paradigm suggests is required if a system
is to be "essentially human."
This is not to say that the conclusion to be drawn
is that the end served by AFDC is wrong, or even that AFDC
is a poor program.

Assuming that the goal of having each

such parent receive $10,000.00 per year is otherwise
appropriate; the program is feasible and suitable; and the
cost is acceptable, it is, in its processes and its
policies, not "essentially human."
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It is true that as the single-parent problem is
identified, discussed, debated, and solved, certain members
of the community become more involved and employ their
Essential Human Capacities.
perspective,

Thus, from a utilitarian

"the greatest good for the greatest number,"

the Essential Human Capacities, on balance, are employed
and the impact of the process and judgment on their
capacities considered.

It would, nonetheless, remain true

that such a program would still not be essentially human
from the perspectives of those most involved or affected at
the time and place of the judgment's most immediate impact.
Indeed, in its final effects, the community
"served" is deprived of even the compassion presumably
represented by the program.

That is, until it happens that

human beings come to love paying taxes and dealing with
bureaucrats, the informal and personal involvement of
autonomous, cooperating human beings that is the goal of
the Essential Interdependence Paradigm cannot be reached by
a program similar to AFDC.

An Essentially Human Welfare Policy
The purpose of this thesis was only to develop and
propose a framework that would support or enclose the far
richer frames of reference that are essential parts of the
way we live in society.

To propose a solution in this case

requires a more comprehensive frame of reference.

The

framework proposed by this thesis works only as a skeletal
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structure designed to support and/or enclose something more
comprehensive.

A frame of reference does more: it is a

structure of views of reality; symbols and concepts, and
valuations and values by means of which an individual or
group perceives or evaluates data, communicates ideas, and
regulates behavior.

A frame of reference builds upon, or

is contained by, a framework.
However, the framework developed herein does
suggest the essentially human process, structures, and
systems for a community to follow to arrive at a solution,
though it cannot suggest the solution itself.

Just as

following the methodological guidelines suggested that the
AFDC was essentially dehumanizing, the framework suggests a
process that would mitigate that result or be essentially
humanizing.

Community Consciousness and Compassion Centers
For the process and solution to be essentially
human, community involvement in solving our single-parent’s
problem would revolve around established centers, based in
neighborhoods or communities within the broader community.
One is tempted to call these centers "resource centers,"
but they are much more than that.

They are community

centers that will facilitate the involvement of the
community in solving community welfare problems.
motto might be,

"To Understand is To Care."

Their

As such, their

function is to solve such problems through raising the
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consciousness of the community and providing the
opportunity for the exercise of community compassion, so
that individuals, groups, and communities might make more
effective, efficient, and safe choices for action and
argument.

Hence, something akin to "Community

Consciousness and Compassion Centers"
their sense (see also Gott 1995).2

(C-* Centers) conveys

The area they serve

would be the modern day equivalent meeting the Aristotelian
admonition that the polls should not extend beyond the
herald's call (Politics 7.4.1326a6-b26).

Technology may

have increased that area, or it may remain much the same.
This would be a fruitful topic for research.
The solution to the problem raised by this thesis
would be approached by the community in three phases and be
part of a larger community initiative (see Carpenter 1991;
Folger 1991; Van Slyck and Stern 1991; Woolpert 1991), only
one of which would be visible to point our single-parent
enters this story.
Phase I includes the devolution of welfare policy
to the community and the integration of the community's
public agencies and private organizations to identify the
full welfare services spectrum of support required in the
community.

Since the Federal government has greatly

increased its welfare role since the 1960s (Rein 1974), and
the private sector has not provided such services across
the full welfare services spectrum (Katz 1984), present
welfare policy would continue in this phase.
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Initially, the government function would continue
its welfare role while actively involving more and more of
the community as possible while preparing its own employees
and unions through education and attrition for the changes
ahead.

Social work degree curricula would begin to change

to reflect the new vision, values, and notions of
excellence of social welfare.

Federal, state, and local

governments would enact laws and regulations initiating and
enabling the transition.

The community would establish

inter-agency/organization steering committees.
Government agencies would sponsor, facilitate, and
participate in communities of inquiry of those involved or
affected by the community's welfare requirements.

Their

purpose would be to determine what spectrum of welfare
services the community requires.

Their goal would be

reaching Quality Public Judgments as to what services the
community requires, yet are not delivered by government
agency or private organization.

Later the government would

sponsor, facilitate, and participate in communities of
inquiry tasked to determine how to further encourage the
community, through privatization or "volunteerization," to
assume all or some of the welfare services the government
provides.
As a matter of policy, agencies and organizations
would see problems, conflict and failure as opportunities
for learning and growth.

This notion would be embedded in

agency and organization purpose, vision, and mission
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statements.

Methods of learning from services rendered

would be developed as well as the means to distribute the
skills, knowledge, or understanding derived from experience
to the community as a whole.
Phase I would require a change in tax policy
reducing Federal taxes and increasing state or local taxes
or voluntary contributions.

In the transition, Federal tax

policy might increase the charitable deduction to increase
contributions to community-based non-profit organizations.
Federal welfare policy would include funding for community
conversion efforts, that is, privatization and/or
volunteerization.

Other essentially human initiatives

would begin in parallel: community mediation programs for
public policy issues, neighborhood mediation centers for
dispute resolution, peer mediation for conflicts in the
schools, vietim-offender reconciliation programs, and
public education pursued through expanded use of the
community of inquiry described.
be persuaded to do likewise.)

(Private education would
The goal of all these

initiatives would be to have action and argument in the
community conducted in an "essentially human" manner as a
matter of individual habit and community custom and
tradition.
Phase II would be devoted to the communities
developing

Centers: building the facilities, training

facilitators to staff them, developing systems and
structures to insure community agency interoperability, and
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implementing the changes.

Community participation would be

the norm: local materials, architecture, art, steering
committees, communications, and people would be employed as
much as possible to encourage the community involvement
theme.
Community meetings would be continuous throughout
this phase.

The community would organize and/or develop

non-profit organizations to meet requirements of the full
welfare services spectrum.

Their purpose, vision, and

mission statements would be developed or adapted to reflect
clearly their role in meeting the community's needs.

Their

structures, strategies and systems would be developed or
adapted to meet those needs.

Their organizational frames

of reference would expressly include cooperation in inquiry
and action with other community agencies and organizations
to meet community needs.
Learning from services offered would be an
objective of all agencies and organizations.

Formally

educating the public as to the vision, values, and notions
of excellence embodied in the C 3 Centers would begin in
this phase.

Communications systems between community

agencies and organizations would be put in place.
Integrated triage and hand-off procedures from one agency
or organization to another would be developed and
exercised.

Assessment of community requirements would be

continuous.
Phase III would be where our single parent enters
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the program.

The C3 Centers, as far as can be reasonably

projected, would be operated by the government or under
government contract.

The Centers would have on-site triage

personnel to identify immediate needs and prioritize
available resources.

In an emergency, triage personnel

could waive health and safety measures, such as the number
of people to a room, the qualifications of day care
personnel, or surge housing in temporary over-flow
buildings that do not meet Federal Americans with
Disabilities Act requirements— provided it was a Quality
Judgment.

Representatives, or points of contact, for all

community agencies and organizations across the full
welfare services spectrum would be available through open
lines of communication.
The following steps would be taken, to a greater or
lesser degree, depending upon the context of the
applicant's problem.

Since the precise nature of each

applicant's problem is as varied as the persons involved
and affected, the first step is the definition of the
problem before proceeding to develop a process to find a
solution or involve the persons affected.

If one defines a

problem as a gap between a desired future and current
reality where there is no reasonable expectation that human
action will bridge the gap, this would require an
understanding of the visions, views of reality, and
expectations of all those involved and affected.

Using the

methodological guides to identify those involved and
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affected and the character of their relationships to the
applicant, the facilitator would develop a history of the
applicant and her involvement in the community, help the
community sort out critical issues, identify persons
involved or affected, and gain a sense of what the process
might involve.

At the same time, the facilitator would

educate those involved or affected by the problem about the
Center's role, establish credibility, and encourage
participation in the process of finding and implementing a
solution.
The facilitator would work with those involved and
affected to design and set up a process for productive
discussions.

She would work with them to define a problem

in a way that all parties can accept as something to work
together to solve, determine necessary roles and identify
who should fill them, suggest a process frame of reference,
establish a plan of action and milestones for the process,
help those involved source resources to pursue the process,
and integrate the possible solutions offered by
participants.

A steering committee drawn from those

involved and affected might be selected.

A resource group

of professionals with expertise in the economic, social,
psychological, political, and legal aspects of the
applicant's situation would be identified and the logistics
of their availability arranged.
Many of these situations will be routine or
typical, so that few complex issues will be raised and
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procedures will be fairly standardized.

However, there may

be larger community issues raised by the specific problem
of the applicant.

For example, the employer may argue that

the applicant is not productive enough to justify a higher
wage.

If found to be true, education officials may be

approached to see if some course of study should be
developed or modified in some respect.

So, initial

sessions might deal with major issues raised during the
interviews, but will always deal with process objectives.
In any event, even if considered routine, the problem is
still defined and the process selected relative to that
applicant, rather than according to some centralized
bureaucracy's notion of what the process should look like.
The participants might agree to have an expert
participate and she, or one of the lay participants, might
write a paper addressing issues raised by the participants.
The resource group would be reasonably available for
technical data research, conceptual development, or
assistance in surfacing valuations and values during the
process.
Early in the process, a plan of action and
milestones tied to specific goals and objectives should
emerge as a living document; revision would be continuous.
Until the problem is resolved, dialogue and discussion
would continue in plenary sessions, caucus meetings, and
work group sessions.

The caucuses would allow involved

parties to discuss issues and possible revisions to the
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program alone with the facilitator.

A working group, drawn

from the steering committee and resource group, might be
created to facilitate resolution of problems that are
shared by multiple persons.
Persons who would almost certainly be invited to
participate are the parents of the child; the extended
family; church and education representatives; employer(s);
and a representative of the community agencies and
organizations administering available funds.

Under some

circumstances, the child herself, or a representative or
guardian ad litem, might be involved to fully garner all
relevant perspectives.
Agency and organization representatives would be
empowered to authorize the expenditure of funds in a manner
tailored to the needs of the applicant with minimal
reference to the sourcing agency or organization.

He or

she would be guided by broad principles reflecting the
shared vision, values, and notions of excellence of the
community and the agency or organization.

The sources of

the funds controlled by the community representative(s)
would be the community itself; there would be no outside
source to solve that which is considered a community
problem.
The program itself would balance the vision,
values, and notions of excellence of the community in the
long-run with the essential humanity of the child and
parents.

Here is where the solution cannot be pursued
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further with certainty.

In our present communities, our

vision, values, and notions of excellence do not truly
support the fullest development of the essential human
capacities of our children, as the norm is for both parents
to work relatively soon after a child is born.

The child

is frequently left with a day care provider or in a day
care center.

Unless the community shares the assumption

that the parents, presumptively, are the persons best
situated to develop the Essential Human Capacities of the
child, the program would not likely provide for the mother
to stay home and raise her child for the two or three years
that most experts agree is the essentially formative period
in the child's life.
However, in a society where its vision, values, and
notions of excellence include the fullest development of
the essential human capacities— and the community shares
the assumption that the parents, presumptively, are the
persons best situated to develop the Essential Human
Capacities of the child— the program would support such
development.

However, this is a rebuttable presumption.

If the parents are incapable or unwilling of developing the
child's Essential Human Capacities, such facilitation,
persuasion, manipulation, or coercion as would be required,
or appropriate (given the vision, values, and notions of
excellence of the community) would be applied to insure
that the child's capacities are so developed.

It would be

irresponsible, as a matter of public policy, to merely
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support the existence of a parent and child where it was
known that the parents were unwilling or incapable of
developing the child's Essential Human Capacities.
Where appropriate, the program would provide for
both the child's and the parents' development.

Where even

coercion fails to lead to the development of the child's
capacities, the child would be considered endangered in an
essentially human sense and removed from the biological
parents.

If required and available, foster parents for the

child would be found relatively early in her life.

If

enough time passed that the foster parents became the
child's essentially human parents, then they would be
allowed to adopt the child to the exclusion of the
biological parents.

Biological parenting would not take

priority over essential human parenting.
At various steps along the way, participants would
describe what they have learned through the process.
the late Rear Admiral Jay Proust used to say,
is thought out."

As

"Written out

So, these descriptions would be recorded

and would be included in a lessons-learned library, similar
to legal appellate court decisions.

There would be walls

of bookcases with bound reports of lessons-learned from
involved or affected persons.

Eventually they would be

catalogued, digested, and have a citation system developed
so that they could be readily referenced and valuable
lessons would not be lost to the community.
The problem in our instant situation might be
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resolved through skills enhancement or negotiation skills
training; a facilitator may assist her in pleading her case
for a raise;

job counseling may find a situation paying

more; an agency may supplement her wage during the
foregoing efforts, or indefinitely; financial management
may be provided to help her reduce her expenses;
cooperative arrangements might be made to reduce expenses
or improve the quality of her life (e.g., car pooling); or
the community may weigh on the father, family, or church
for support.
Such a relatively rule-free program would be
subject to abuse, of course.

For example, a wage

supplement could operate as unfair competition for rivals
to the employer who do not receive what is, in effect, a
wage subsidy.

But, in an environment where argument and

action are based upon well-developed, maintained, and
employed or facilitated Essential Human Capacities, those
involved or affected would be expected to participate in a
community of inquiry to resolve the problems of a member of
the community.
If the process were to be pursued in this manner,
as an isolated program, abuse would probably be the norm.
But in an environment where other initiatives are likewise
on-going— community mediation programs for public policy
issues, neighborhood mediation centers for dispute
resolution, peer mediation for conflicts in the schools,
victim-offender reconciliation programs, and public
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education pursued through expanded use of the community of
inquiry— abuse should be reduced.

Where Quality Judgment

is an individual habit and community custom and tradition,
abuse should be reduced still further.

In any event, the

marginal cost of paying for tailored solutions that involve
the members of the community in solving community problems
should be less over the long-term than current programs
that have less flexibility in remedies.
Prospects for Successful Implementation
The advantages of this process are numerous, though
the problems with it are probably insurmountable in the
present environment.

Nonetheless, it is a valuable

exercise because it highlights just how flawed our present
society and its programs are in this area.
First, as an advantage, this process involves all
those affected, if they are willing to be involved.
disadvantage,

Its

in our present environment, is that it is

probable that many of those affected would not be willing
to participate and the process would not have the multiple
perspectives required to achieve Essential Human Truth.
Second, as an advantage, it tailors a solution to the
vision, values, and notions of excellence of the
participants and the community and employs the
participant's Essential Human Capacities.

Its disadvantage

is that, in the present environment, there will be little
such vision, values, and notions of excellence shared by
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the participants and the community.

Thus, the community

may come to see its resources as misused or wasted.

Third,

as an advantage, the government agency bureaucrats would be
empowered to make a judgment based upon their own Quality
Judgment— judgments based upon the well-formed visions,
values, and notions of excellence of the participants and
the community.

Its disadvantage is that the process would

consume more time, would produce results in different cases
that might appear to be inconsistent to outside observers,
and might invite corruption or be otherwise abused.
Finally, as an advantage, the resources would be
contributed by the members of the community to meet the
community’s vision, values, and notions of excellence such
that they would actually have contributed to the welfare of
their own community.

Thus, this should increase the sense

of involvement in, understanding of, and responsibility for
the good of the community among its members.

The

disadvantages are that the moneys might still be the
product of coercion in the form of taxation unless they
were truly voluntary contributions, in which case some
citizens may not make a reasonable contribution, breeding
resentment.
event.

There could be no national standard in any

Further, some reasonable limits to proselytizing of

agency or organization vision, values, and notions of
excellence would have to be imposed.
As I write this, every instinct screams that such a
program is not practical.

So, why propose it?

The
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perfectly reasonable question in reply is, if it is not
practical, why not?

And, if not, what does that tell us

about present programs?
If we have agreed that consciousness and compassion
are fundamental to the choices that lead to action and
argument, why would we not make important choices such as
these at some sort of community-based consciousness and
compassion centers?

If we understand the problems of a

member of our community, why would we not care?

If we

care, would we not learn from that understanding?

If we

believe our communities and the lives of our children are
important, why could we not find the time or resources to
be involved in the welfare of our own communities?
If we do not have the time or resources to care
voluntarily for the disadvantaged among us, how can we
believe that we live in a community that is good and true
and beautiful?

If we, as a community, do not have shared

visions, values, and notions of excellence, what do we
believe is binding our communities together?

If we cannot

trust our "public servants" to make Quality Judgments in
such matters, why do we believe that rules-bound
bureaucrats can make the choices any better?

If we cannot

entrust the politicians and bureaucrats with these matters,
what matters "should we entrust to them?
testing?

Nuclear weapons

Nuclear waste disposal and storage?

retirement income and health care?

Our

Finally, if the

individual communities are not willing to contribute or be
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taxed to care for the disadvantaged, why should there be a
national standard to maintain a community that is not
willing or able to care for its members?
Our present welfare system begs these questions.
If on analysis, this approach seems to be too impracticable
and what has been demonstrated to be an essentially
dehumanizing approach (AFDC and its kindred programs, or
some variation thereof) is preferable, then this speaks
volumes about our view of human nature, how we see
ourselves, and how we see our communities: either our view
of human nature is such that a good, true, and beautiful
community is not even theoretically possible; or we have no
shared vision; values, or notions of excellence sufficient
to support an essential human welfare policy.

If either is

the case, then welfare policy in our nation stands less as
an aspect of choice as a function of consciousness and
compassion than as an exercise in power and crowd control.
There may, perhaps, be a more simple answer.
Perhaps the answer is simply that welfare policy cannot be
essentially human unless it is community-based merely for
epistemological reasons.

It may that we cannot otherwise

know each other well enough to understand each other, to
have insight into one another's problems, and, ultimately,
to care.

As Aristotle noted in the Politics over two

thousand years ago:
in order to decide questions of justice and in order to
distribute offices according to merit it is necessary
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for the citizens to know each ot h e r 's personal
characters, since where this does not happen to be the
case the business of electing officials and trying law
suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is
unjust in both matters, and this must obviously prevail
in an excessively numerous community.
(7.4.1326bl4-21;
see also Schollmeier 1994, 109-10)
Then again, as Robert Frost wrote:
neighbors."

"Good fences make good

This framework cannot provide the complete

answers, but it does raise the essential questions and
suggests the process, structure, and systems required to
answer them.

Conclusion and New Beginning
We have taken a journey from a description of the
current state of ethics and policy studies through a
discussion of the nature and severity of the problem and
then developed a new framework for approaching ethics and
policy studies based upon the Essential Human Capacities of
critical and creative thinking; communicating in symbols
and concepts; and cooperating in inquiry and action.

We

have implemented these capacities through an Essentially
Human Judgment Process that requires that the Essential
Human Capacities of all involved or affected be used, or
facilitated, and the impact of the judgment upon those
capacities taken into account.

We have explored what

Quality Judgment and Quality Action within an Essential
Interdependence Paradigm would look like.

We have

connsidered a number of policy implications derived from
the judgment process itself and a number of relatively
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objective guidelines for judgment making, implementing, and
evaluating.
Finally, having applied the guidelines to perhaps
the most pressing issue of the day, we have found the
existing programs to be essentially dehumanizing and have
developed a concept of the Community Consciousness and
Compasion Center as a process, structure, and system
suggested by the framework itself.

However, as this

framework requires, even principles derived through the
framework itself, if they are to be Quality Judgments, must
be open to reexamination involving the whole community in
cooperative inquiry.
This approach, then, goes beyond deontology, which
looks at what duty we might have as we know the world
today, to looking toward the implications of today's acts
for the world of tomorrow.

It goes beyond what can now be

seen as a superficial consequentialism by looking at the
type of world a policy would create, rather than what
current problems a policy would solve.

It goes beyond

Friedrich Nietzsche (who went beyond good and evil) by
seeing participation in life with others to be an integral
part of living and an essential adjunct to a will to power.
Moreover, it retains the burden of decision, for powerful
epistemological reasons, on each of us as individuals
because no single individual or group of individuals could
have the essential human knowledge required to develop and
maintain the essential human capacities of all those
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affected.
This approach is not mandatory, of course.

All

persons have the power to choose among competing theories.
However, an Essential Interdependence Paradigm places the
burden of proof on the proponent to articulate what
consistent principle she is applying in taking actions that
are not essentially human.

Thus, a person working within

the Essential Interdependence Paradigm would be ethically
free to follow any particular course in life, provided she
could explain what principle, consistent with that
framework, she is following in not respecting the
development, maintenance, and employment of the Essential
Human Capacities of all those involved or affected.
It is my hope that this thesis developed a
framework that may aid in a coming to public judgment
through inquiry and reflection, discussion and dialogue
that develops, maintains, and employs that which is most
essentially human in us all: critical and creative
thinking; communicating in symbols and concepts; and
cooperating in inquiry and action.

Our resulting frames of

reference should be richer, and serve us better, in
creating the lives we truly desire to live.
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Chapter Notes/8
^-Participation of members of the affected population
should be considered to the degree that each is "informed
and competent," that is, more weight should be given to
those adept in the skills that implement the Essential
Human Capacities.
Accordingly, some participants' opinions will be
Quality Judgments accorded great weight.
Other
participants' opinions will be considered "Mere Opinion"
and given little weight beyond consideration of the fact
that those were the opinions, possibly only ill-considered
desires, of those participants at the time and in that
place.
Time is a factor here because, as members of a
community are more-or-less informed and/or competent, it
will be reasonable often to make more time available to
those capable of making Quality Judgments rather than to
those capable of only mere opinion.
Note that "informed and competent" in this context does
not preclude the expert and his or her expertise, but it is
unlikely that expertise as presently offered and used will
rise to being Quality Judgment.
The principal shortcoming
will be that one having such specialized knowledge will be
less inclined to consider (as far as reasonably possible)
the points of view of those of the affected population and
will have concentrated on acquiring some knowledge to the
exclusion of all other (see, e.g., Saul 1992; Formaini
1990; McCollough 1991).
related idea in the public policy arena are
"neighborhood environmental justice centers," which would
be part of what one writer styles "an emancipatory justice
strategy" (see Gott 1995, chap. 7).
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